Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup by Snowden, John Rockwell
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 3 Article 2
1997
Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter
in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup
John Rockwell Snowden
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John Rockwell Snowden, Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup, 76 Neb. L. Rev.
(1997)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol76/iss3/2
John Rockwell Snowden*
Second Degree Murder, Malice, and
Manslaughter in Nebraska: New
Juice for an Old Cup
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 400
II. A Brief History of Murder and Malice ................. 401
A. Malice Emerges as a General Criminal Intent or
Bad Attitude ...................................... 403
B. Malice Becomes Premeditation or Prior Planning... 404
C. Malice Matures as Particular States of Intention... 407
III. A History of Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in
Nebraska ............................................. 410
A. The Statutes ...................................... 410
B. The Cases ......................................... 418
IV. Puzzles of Nebraska Homicide Jurisprudence .......... 423
A. The Problem of State v. Dean: What is the Mens
Rea for Second Degree Murder? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
B. The Problem of State v. Jones: May an Intentional
Homicide Be Manslaughter? ....................... 429
C. The Problem of State v. Cave: Must the State Prove
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Accused Did
Not Act from an Adequate Provocation? . . . . . . . . . . . .  438
D. The Problem of State v. Ryan and State v. White:
Are There Excuses or Justifications that Although
Not Recognized and Mandated by Law May Still
Negate Malice? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  443
V. Conclusion (And a Jurisdictional Aside that May Be the
Heart of the Matter) .................................. 449
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author wishes to
thank Kelly Crilow, University of Nebraska College of Law, Class of 1999, for her
contributions of talent and energy to this Article. The Author also extends a spe-
cial thank you to Sherri Tompkins of the Law College staff and Rose Gavin of the
Marvin and Virginia Schmid Law Library.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The law is a hollow vessel; inexhaustible in its uses, fathomless. 1
In 1932, Professor Francis Bowes Sayre began his now founda-
tional article on mens rea by stating that no problem of the criminal
law has been of more fundamental importance or more baffling.2 The
problem, of course, is that the law mandates that every criminal of-
fense must be comprised of a mens rea, or mental element, and an
actus reus, or particular prohibited act. As Bishop said, "[tihere can
be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind."3
In the law of homicide the actus reus is always the same-someone
has caused the death of another. Yet, homicide offenses are tradition-
ally graded into at least two categories: murder or manslaughter. It
is the mental element, the mens rea, that distinguishes the offenses.
For the murder or manslaughter distinction, Bishop clearly was cor-
rect: "the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent .... ."4 The mens
rea that most critically distinguishes murder from manslaughter is
known as malice. A killing with malice is murder; a killing without
malice may be no greater than manslaughter.
A second degree murder conviction in Nebraska has a possible sen-
tence of twenty years to life.5 A manslaughter conviction has a sen-
tencing range from one to twenty years.6 Beyond the context of the
accused individual, the murder-manslaughter distinction is also of sig-
nificant concern to the people, either as direct participants in the legal
process or as watchers for the salvation of the state.
In 1994, the Nebraska Supreme Court unleashed a whirlwind of
controversy with its unanimous opinion in State v. Myers,7 which
firmly established malice as one of the required mens rea elements for
second degree murder.5 Scholarly controversy primarily has focused
1. 'The Tao is like the emptiness of a vessel; and in our employment of it we must be
on our guard against all fullness. How deep and unfathomable it is, as if it were
the Honored Ancestor of all things!" THE TEXTs OF TAOISM ch. 4, at 49-50 (F. Max
Mifller ed., James Legge trans., 1962)(writings of Tao Te Ching).
2. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HA~v. L. Ruv. 974 (1932).
3. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMVINAL LAw § 287 (John M. Zane & Carl
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1930). Professor Sayre relies upon Bishop's statement of
law. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 974.
4. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 974.
5. NEs. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -304 (Reissue 1995).
6. Id. §§ 28-105, -305.
7. 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994).
8. See Leslie Boellstorff, Effort Mounted to Vote Out Judge, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
Sept. 5, 1996, at 13A, Leslie Boelistorff, Legal Experts Argue "Malice" Rule Mer-
its, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, June 2, 1996, at 10A, Leslie Boellstorff, Nelson De-
cries Campaign to Oust High-Court Judge, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Sept. 6, 1996,
at 15A; Leslie Boellstorff, State Court Abused Power, Stenberg Says, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Aug. 10, 1995, at 1A Editorial, Judge's Rulings Become an Elec-
tion Issue, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Sept. 6, 1996, at 20A Editorial, Supreme
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on whether or not the court stepped outside the appropriate judicial
role in Myers,9 and whether or not the court's explanation for its My-
ers opinion two years later in State v. Ryan'0 carried the day."l The
focus here will not question Myers or its justification in Ryan. Rather,
the turn is toward malice and the substantive criminal law.
Malice is almost as old as the common law of homicide. But, its
meaning and function has changed over time with the law itself. Part
H will present a brief history of malice and murder. Malice began as a
general criminal intent, an evil mind or bad attitude. It became tied
to the idea of prior planning of a killing and today is almost every-
where understood as (1) an intent to kill, (2) an intent to do grievous
bodily harm, or (3) an intent to act with a "depraved heart" conscious
disregard of an extreme risk to human life.
Part III will trace the statutory history of murder, malice, and
manslaughter in Nebraska and then will discuss the case law dealing
with malice. By the time Nebraska became a state, the statutes had
dropped any definition of malice. Yet, from the first appearance of
malice in the Nebraska Supreme Court opinions until the present,
malice consistently has been defined as the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse. This definition comes from
the early days of the common law. It is the ancient idea of a general
criminal intent, which distinguishes the criminal from the merely
wrongful. Until very recently, the function of malice in Nebraska
homicide law was minimal at best. But today its hoary visage is
matched by the electric kool-aid elixir the concept carries.
Part IV will consider four recent homicide cases and the puzzles
they create for Nebraska law. What is the mens rea for second degree
murder? May an intentional homicide be manslaughter? Must the
State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act
from an adequate provocation? May excuses or justifications,
although not recognized and mandated by law, negate malice?
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MURDER AND MALICE
In the English law before the 1200s, homicide was treated almost
entirely as a civil matter. The "slayer," as the killer was called, was
required to pay damages to the victim's family and to persons whose
Court's Flawed Reasoning May Free Two Convicted Killers, OmsH WoRLD HER-
ALD, Oct. 12, 1995, at 30A George F. Will, Editorial, Nebraska Problem: Judges
as Legislators, Oimr WORLD HERALD, Oct. 1, 1995, at 11B.
9. See Don Stenberg, Malice in Wonderland, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 15 (1996).
10. 249 Neb 218, 543 N.W.2d 128 (1996).
11. Richard E. Shugrue, The Second Degree Murder Doctrine in Nebraska, 30
CREIGHTON L. REv. 20 (1996).
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"peace" had been "broken" by the killing.12 No criminal sanctions
were imposed. It was lawful and even proper for kindred of the victim
to avenge themselves by killing the offender. Few saw any need for
the government to impose punishment.1 3 When the slayer was un-
known, "morth-works" or "murdrum" described deeds of darkness, 14
or, more specifically, secret killings, which resulted in a fine on the
township (known as a murdrum fine or as "Englishry).15 This possi-
bly may have been the first emergence of the use of the word murder
to describe a type of homicide.16 Thinking that the fine was too heavy
of a burden for the township to bear, a transition occurred in which
the homicide was viewed as an offense against the state, not just a
wrong against the victim's survivors. 17 Thereafter, the state took on
the responsibility of punishing the offender.
Two broad categories of homicides were created: felonious homi-
cide (often simply called culpable homicide),18 which was a capital of-
fense; and nonfelonious homicide (a noncapital offense).19 Felonious
homicide described any homicide that was not justifiable or excusa-
ble.20 The most typical felonious homicide in the thirteenth century
was a killing upon a sudden occasion, usually a drunken quarrel fol-
lowed by a brawl and the use of a knife or club, which every man car-
ried.21 Pleas of misadventure or self-defense (raised when seeking a
grant of pardon) were claims that the offender had acted in an excus-
ing, nonfelonious circumstance. 2 2
12. 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 23 (London,
MacMillan 1883).
13. Id. at 24-25.
14. Id. at 25. "Murdrum" is the Latinized form of "morth."
15. Id. at 28, 31, 35.
16. Id. at 25. See also J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter-
Part I, 83 LAw Q. REv. 365, 369 (1967)(stating that in the thirteenth century, the
word murder was connected to the murder fine and ancient meaning of "morth,"
but it was also used to refer to all culpable homicide-being used generally as a
"nontechnical" term, i.e., not a legally defined term); Sayre, supra note 2, at 995
(stating that by the end of the twelfth century, murder was used to describe the
most serious homicide, which was a killing committed in secret with no one see-
ing or knowing about it).
17. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 26.
18. Kaye, supra note 16 (using the term culpable homicide to refer generally to homi-
cides not justified or excused).
19. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRnNmAL LAw § 7.1, at 605 (2d ed.
1986); Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600,
74 MICH. L. REv. 413, 419 (1976)(stating that all felonious homicides were capital
offenses).
20. Sayre, supra note 2, at 996.
21. Kaye, supra note 16, at 370.
22. Id. at 374.
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Nonfelonious homicide was further divided into justifiable homi-
cide and excusable homicide.23 Justifiable homicides were killings
done in furtherance of justice or in execution of a warrant and resulted
in outright acquittals. 24 Excusable homicides (or pardonable homi-
cides) were homicides committed in self-defense or by "misadventure"
(also referred to as per infortunium).25 Homicide by misadventure oc-
curred when "a man doth an act that is not unlawful, which without
any evil intent tendeth to a man's death."26 Although responsibility
did attach to offenders, they were allowed to ask the king for a pardon
(which was almost always granted). In such cases, the offender suf-
fered only imprisonment until the pardon was granted; the expense of
procuring a pardon; forfeiture of the offender's property; and contin-
ued liability until the disposition of an appeal by the next of kin of the
victim. 2 7
A. Malice Emerges as a General Criminal Intent or
Bad Attitude
Homicide law experienced considerable change throughout the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. 28 In 1278, a statute
purported to limit the use of pardons by requiring any claim of justifi-
able homicide, killing by misadventure, or killing in self-defense to be
tried first by a jury. If the jury found that the homicide occurred by
misadventure or self-defense, then a special verdict was issued, and
the King could grant a pardon.29
This statute also required the jury to find that the killing was "not
by felony or of malice aforethought."30 Malice aforethought (also re-
ferred to as "premeditated malice"31 or "malice prepense"32) had be-
come a term of law during the late 1200s. 33 When associated with
homicides, however, it meant no more than "deliberately," "wickedly,"
"willfully," or "without lawful excuse"-a general expression used to
denote the mental element required of felonious homicide, but had
23. Green, supra note 19, at 419 (stating that the two subcategories of nonfelonious
homicide, justifiable and excusable, were firmly established by the early thir-
teenth century).
24. Sayre, supra note 2, at 994-95.
25. Id.; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 57.
26. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 57.
27. Sayre, supra note 2, at 994-95. An appeal was a private prosecution brought by
close relatives of the victim to recover the civil damages discussed above. See
Green, supra note 19, at 419 n.22.
28. Sayre, supra note 2, at 994.
29. Id. at 995; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 37-38, 76.
30. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 41; Sayre, supra note 2, at 996.
31. Kaye, supra note 16, at 375.
32. Sayre, supra note 2, at 996.
33. Kaye, supra note 16, at 371-73.
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nothing to do with actual premeditation, malevolence, or spite.3 4 Put
another way, felonious homicides were defined as killings with malice
(meaning deliberate and neither justifiable nor excusable), but malice
was understood only as a "threshold degree" of mens rea.3 5 Malice
was a bad attitude, a lack of any colorable, noncriminal explanation or
legitimating reason. Professor Kaye argues that if it had meant pre-
meditation, malevolence, or spite-a much narrower definition-it
would have allowed persons who killed another deliberately "upon a
sudden occasion" (the most typical culpable homicide) to ask for a par-
don since those persons would, in most instances, neither have
planned the killing nor acted with particular ill will.36
After 1340, the fine for murdrum was abolished, yet the term
"murder" continued to be commonly used to describe the worst kind of
homicide.37 During this time, evidence tends to show that Parliament
desired to create four types of homicide: (1) murder-killing by se-
crecy or stealth, (2) killing by ambush, (3) killing by assault along the
highway, and (4) killing "par malice prepense," which included all
other killing not excused or justified.38 In 1380, the King authorized a
commission to study types of homicide. The commission described
similar categories, distinguishing between "murders" and "killings by
ambush or by malice prepense."3 9 These distinctions had no proce-
dural or substantive affect on homicide law. Instead, they merely
caused diversity in the enrolling of indictments since the procedure
and punishment for the crimes were the same-all were culpable and
thus punishable by death. In addition, killings by "malice prepense,"
although distinguished categorically, still included all culpable homi-
cides because by definition they were killings "without justification or
excuse."
B. Malice Becomes Premeditation or Prior Planning
In 1389, because the King was granting pardons too readily, a de-
cree was issued stating that "no charter of pardon shall be henceforth
allowed before any justice for murder, the death of a man killed by
making assault or malice prepense (ou malice purpense)."4o Commen-
tators on malice aforethought argue that the codification of this decree
in the Statute of 1390 was the first statutory recognition of "malice
34. Id. at 369, 372-73, 375, 377.
35. Green, supra note 19, at 419.
36. Kaye, supra note 16, at 374.
37. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 40; Kaye, supra note 16, at 377 (stating that the
word murder was popularly used to describe the actus reus of all homicides and
more specifically the actus reus of secret or "stealthy" homicide); Sayre, supra
note 2, at 995.
38. Kaye, supra note 16, at 369.
39. Id. at 390.
40. Sayre, supra note 2, at 996.
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aforethought."41 There is disagreement, however, on what type of kill-
ings were murder and what malice aforethought actually meant. The
Statute of 1390 was written when old ideas that ambushing consti-
tuted the worst kind of homicide (murder) were giving way to new
ideas that killings done with premeditation, malevolence, or spite
were the worst kind and warranted the title of murder.4 2 Stated an-
other way, the heinousness of the crimes began to depend on degrees
of mens rea or mental intentions instead of different types of actus
reus or the manner and circumstance of the killing act.43
The Statute of 1390 tried to carry out the decree by making pardon
requests for homicides committed through murder, ambush, assault,
or by malice aforethought very expensive, and by requiring that a jury
determine the type of killing committed. 44 Professor Kaye argues that
(1) the Statute of 1390 defined types of homicides considered to be par-
ticularly heinous and tried to make it impossible for the Crown to par-
don them;45 (2) Parliament intended to categorically distinguish
killings by secrecy or stealth (entitled murder), killings by ambush
(adding to this category killings as a result of highway attacks), and
all other killings that were not excusable or justifiable (killings by
malice aforethought-the "residue of culpable homicide"); (3) murder
still meant killings by secrecy or stealth, and these types were distin-
guished only by their method and setting; and (4) "malice prepense,"
as used in the Statute of 1390, had not yet come to mean "premedi-
tated, spite or malevolence." 46
Professor Green, however, argues that malice aforethought in the
Statute of 1390 was not simply the "threshold degree of mens rea for
felony," as Professor Kaye suggests, because this would have "swal-
lowed up" the other categories of homicides listed in the statute (mur-
der, ambush, and assault) and would have restricted the King's
pardoning power in all cases of felonious homicide. Green argues in-
stead that malice aforethought was "a new term of art encompassing
homicides committed through true planning or premeditation," and
therefore the King's pardoning power would be restrained only in
cases involving the most serious felonious homicides.47 Kaye's re-
sponse to this argument is that in the sixteenth century, when malice
prepense began to be interpreted literally as premeditation, denoting
the mens rea for murder, it was easy for writers to make an "ex post
facto rationalization of the 1390 Statute, since premeditation can
41. Id.; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 42-43; Kaye, supra note 16, at 366.
42. Kaye, supra note 16, at 367.
43. Id. at 367-68.
44. Green, supra note 19, at 462.
45. Kaye, supra note 16, at 368.
46. Id. at 369.
47. Green, supra note 19, at 462.
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without much effort be discerned in 'killing by secrecy or stealth' and
in qilling from ambush[.]"4 8
The Statute of 1390 was short-lived and by the end of the fifteenth
century seemed to be obsolete.49 The next major change in homicide
law developed throughout the fifteenth century and culminated with
the Statute of 1512, which divided felonious homicide into murder and
"chance medley" (later called manslaughter).5 0 Chance medley in-
cluded both "sudden encounter" homicides51 (also called "sudden occa-
sion" or "sudden falling out" homicides)52 and accidental killings that
were not excusable.5 3 Although deliberate, the sudden encounter
homicide was considered manslaughter if it resulted from "presuma-
bly any fight which has broken out without any prior ambushing of
one party by another."5 4 An accidental killing resulting from unlawful
acts of violence was manslaughter as long as the violence was not di-
rected at the victim.55 If the violent act was directed at the victim, the
perpetrator would be liable for murder.5 6 If the act was lawful, it
would have been excusable as a homicide by misadventure. 57 These
distinctions were not yet based on the presence or absence of malice
aforethought; rather, they simply determined whether the accused
warranted benefit of clergy.5 8
Both murder and manslaughter (chance medley) were still capital
felonies, but murder was "unclergyable."5 9 Benefit of clergy involved a
process that ultimately allowed people who could read (called "clerks")
the privilege of exemption from the criminal death penalty.6O After
simply reading a psalm correctly, the offender was removed from the
secular court jurisdiction and turned over to the ecclesiastical courts
to be tried-a much less rigorous process resulting in minimal punish-
ment.6 1 The benefit of clergy had been greatly expanded during the
fifteenth century, and in an attempt to curtail its use, the Statute of
48. Kaye, supra note 16, at 393.
49. Green, supra note 19, at 469; J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Man-
slaughter-Part II, 83 LAw Q. REv. 569, 569 (1967).
50. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, § 7.1(a), at 605; Kaye, supra note 49, at 573.
51. Kaye, supra note 49, at 574.
52. Kaye, supra note 16, at 365.
53. Id. at 369; Green, supra note 19, at 485 n.258.
54. Kaye, supra note 49, at 574.
55. Kaye, supra note 16, at 369.
56. Id. at 370.
57. Kaye, supra note 49, at 582.
58. Id. at 572; Green, supra note 19, at 483.
59. Green, supra note 19, at 483; Kaye, supra note 16, at 365.
60. BLAcK's LAW DicTIONARY 158 (6th ed. 1990).
61. Id.
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1512 excluded laymen who had committed predatory and premedi-
tated acts of violence, known as "murders," from its protection. 62
Following the Statute of 1512 was a series of "Tudor Statutes,"
completed in 1547, which withdrew benefit of clergy from murder. 63
At that time, murder was described as "wilful prepensed murders,"
"prepensedly murder," "murder upon malice prepensed," "willful mur-
der of malice prepensed," and "murder of malice prepensed." 64
Whatever the understanding of "malice" and its adjectives had been in
the Statute of 1390, the common law judges now treated malice as
referring to a premeditated killing. As a result, felonious homicides
were divided into premeditated killings (murder-malice), which were
punishable by death, and killings without malice aforethought (man-
slaughter), which, since clergyable, were usually punishable only by
imprisonment for one year and branding on the brawn of the thumb.65
C. Malice Matures as Particular States of Intention
Beginning in 1547, the English courts attached varying meanings
to malice aforethought. 66 Malice continued to be understood generally
as "a deliberate premeditated design to kill or hurt,"6 7 and still re-
ferred more to planning and motive than an isolated intent. 68 Never-
theless, in an attempt to establish a greater range of homicides as
worthy of the death penalty, the common law judges began to desig-
nate certain types of killings as murder without fitting them into the
prior planning requirement. Thus, the idea of implied malice began to
emerge. Sir Anthony Fitzherbert, the greatest common law lawyer of
the time,6 9 argued that "[wilful murder of malice prepensed" did not
cover just killings by ambush or with premeditation; rather, the divi-
sion between murder and manslaughter was still unclear. 70 Implied
malice was one way of fitting the older types of murders (that were not
premeditated) under the "with malice aforethought" requirement
without forcing common law judges to create exceptions to the rule
requiring malice for murder.7 1 It was also a way for judges to convict
offenders they thought deserving of murder, even though the offender
had not killed with premeditation.
62. Green, supra note 19, at 473, 475-76. See also Kaye, supra note 49, at 572 (stat-
ing that the Statute of 1512 was the first statute to withdraw the benefit of clergy
from culpable homicide other than petty treason).
63. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 44; Kaye, supra note 16, at 368.
64. Sayre, supra note 2, at 996.
65. Id. at 996-97; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 45; Kaye, supra note 16, at 369-70.
66. Kaye, supra note 16, at 369; Sayre, supra note 2, at 997.
67. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 63.
68. Sayre, supra note 2, at 997.
69. Kaye, supra note 49, at 575.
70. Id. at 577.
71. Kaye, supra note 16, at 370.
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Mansell and Herbert's Case,72 heard in 1558, is one early example
in which the court implied malice.73 Herbert and a band of some forty
followers went to the house of Sir Richard Mansfield intending to fight
with Mansfield, but without any intention to cause the death of any
person. One person in Herbert's party, without any prior plan or in-
tent to kill, threw a stone that killed a woman. It was never clear
whether the woman killed was an adherent of Mansfield or a complete
stranger to the affray. Due to this question, the case was never
brought to conclusion. Nevertheless, the majority of the judges agreed
that if the victim had been associated with Mansfield, and thus an
intended victim of some violence, murder would have been estab-
lished. After Herbert's Case, "wilful murder of malice prepensed" was
broadly interpreted to include cases in which the killing was intended
(but not premeditated), and the intent was only to do physical harm or
to do any unlawful act of violence.74
In 1576, the doctrine of "heated blood" (known today as provoca-
tion) emerged, allowing what normally would have been murder to be
reduced to manslaughter when the killing was done in the heat of pas-
sion. In the typical case of provocation, a sudden quarrel (the provoca-
tion) between two combatants raises the "heat of passion7 in one who
then forms an intent to kill. But, the provocation is seen as a partial
excuse for the intent to kill, and the homicide is reduced to man-
slaughter. In discussing the history of murder and malice, it is most
important to notice that the "malice aforethought" of murder was con-
tinuing to shed notions of prior planning, i.e., a premeditated intent to
kill. Courts found murder if the defendant's passion was unreasona-
ble or if sufficient time allowed the passion to cool.7 5
Eventually, a general set of rules for malice and murder emerged,
leaving behind the notion that malice referred to an undifferentiated
criminal intent or required premeditation. These rules were summa-
rized in 1628 by Coke,76 whose writings "had extra ordinary influence
on every part of the law," and, as Stephen suggests, whose rules were
the "root of the branch of the law as to malice aforethought."77 Ac-
cording to Coke's definition, murder occurred "when a man... unlaw-
fully killeth ... any reasonable creature... with malice aforethought,
either expressed by the party or implied by law."78 Malice afore-
thought occurred when one "compasseth to kill, wound or beat an-
72. 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (KB. 1558).
73. Kaye, supra note 49, at 577-92.
74. Id.
75. Kaye, supra note 49, at 589-90.
76. Sayre, supra note 2, at 997.
77. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 54.
78. Kaye, supra note 16, at 365; Sayre, supra note 2, at 997 (citing EDWARD COKE,
THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47).
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other, and doth it sedato animo,"79 meaning that he went about or
took a step toward killing "with a settled purpose."80 Malice could be
implied when (1) the killing was without provocation or was by poison,
(2) when an officer was killed in resistance to executing a warrant,
and (3) when the killing resulted from commission of an unlawful
act.81 This understanding of malice allowed courts to enlarge the cat-
egory of homicides designated as murder, effectively allowing more
killers to be punished with capital crimes instead of clergyable
crimes.82
Some courts felt that the category of killings by an unlawful act
was too broad and subsequently narrowed the category to include only
unlawful acts intended to inflict bodily injury.83 The words used in
connection with malice-"aforethought," "prepense," and "deliber-
ate"-no longer had any real meaning except to require the state of
mind that caused the act to precede it.84 In 1762, Sir Michael Foster
published his discourse on homicide, stating that he understood mal-
ice aforethought to mean that "the fact hath been attended with such
circumstances as are the ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved,
malignant spirit," and that most cases of murder dealt with implied
malice and turned on whether or not the killing had "been attended
with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of a
heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief."85 This
seems to be the birth of what is known today as "depraved heart"
murder.
Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law86 and the Criminal Code
Commission's Draft Code (1878-79) both distinguished murder from
manslaughter by the existence of a given state of mind-described in
the Digest as malice aforethought.87 Malice aforethought was (1) in-
tent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (which did not have be di-
rected at the person actually killed); (2) intent to do an act with
knowledge that the act causing the death was likely to cause death or
grievous bodily harm (even if the offender hoped that neither would
result or was indifferent to the outcome); (3) intent to commit a felony;
and (4) intent to oppose by force any officer in the execution of his
duties.88 The second category encompassed "depraved-heart" murder
79. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 55.
80. BLACIHS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 60, at 1357.
81. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 54; Sayre, supra note 2, at 997.
82. Sayre, supra note 2, at 998.
83. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 65.
84. Id. at 70.
85. Id. at 74.
86. Id. at 80. See JAFE~s F. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CniAL LAw 225 (7th ed.
1926).
87. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 82.
88. Id. at 80; 2 CHALEjs E. TORCLA, WHARToN's CPmqAL LAw § 137 (14th ed. 1979).
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and was narrowed, as before, by requiring the act to be dangerous to
life.89
American law followed the general pattern of the English common
law. To the present, American casebooks and treatises consistently
define malice as
(1) An intent to kill someone, not necessarily the victim.... (2) An intent to
commit "serious" or "grievous" bodily injury upon someone. (3) A wanton and
reckless disregard of a very great risk of causing death or serious bodily injury
.... The older statutes use language such as "depraved heart" or an "aban-
doned and malignant heart" to refer to this type of culpability. (4) Malice is
also implied when the defendant or his accomplice commits a killing in the
perpetration of certain felonies. 9 0
As in the past, disputes and problems continue to surround the use
of malice to distinguish murder from manslaughter. One commenta-
tor has even suggested that the use of the word should be removed
from statutes since it seems only to confuse and mislead the jury.9 1
Ironically, in 1977, Nebraska did just that. Nonetheless, much confu-
sion remains.92
III. A HISTORY OF MURDER, MALICE, AND MANSLAUGHTER
IN NEBRASKA
A. The Statutes
The Territory of Nebraska passed its first set of laws at the First
General Assembly early in 1855, adopting Iowa's criminal code:
[Murder, generally]
[§] 4. Whoever kills any human being with malice aforethought either express
or implied is guilty of murder.
[First Degree Murder]
[§] 5. All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait or
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, rob-
bery, mayhem, or burglary, is murder of the first degree and shall be punished
with death.
[Second Degree Murder]
89. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37
COLUM. L. Rxv. 701, 703 (1937).
90. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CR=nmvAL LAw 160 (5th ed. 1995). See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET
AL., CRnmNAL LAw 658 (1997); JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARcus, CRIMINAL LAw
§ 5.05, at 398-400 (3d ed. 1995); GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CMI-
NAL LAw 400 (4th ed. 1996); JosHUA DRESSLER, CmINAL LAW 194-95 (1994);
JOsHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRnmAL LAW § 31.02[3][21, at 468 (2d ed.
1995); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIAMINAL LAw AND ITS
PROCESSES 385-88 (6th ed. 1995); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 8, § 7.1(a), at 607;
ROLLIN M. PERKINs & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRnzmAL LAw 57-78 (3d ed. 1982).
91. Jonathan Matthew Purver, The Language of Murder, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1306,
1308-11 (1967).
92. Act of June 1, 1977, L.B. 38, §§ 18-20, 1977 Neb. Laws 88, 97.
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[§1 6. Whoever commits murder otherwise than is set forth in the preceding
section is guilty of murder of the second degree, and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for life or for a term of not less than ten
years.
[ManIaughterl
[§1 12. Any person guilty of the crime of manslaughter shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than eight years nor less than one
year and by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred
dollars.9 3
In addition, whoever injured someone with a deadly weapon during a
duel was guilty of murder if death resulted.9 4
Although malice was not defined, the code distinguished murder
from manslaughter: any killing done with malice aforethought consti-
tuted murder. Murders (1) committed by poison or lying in wait, (2)
deliberate and premeditated, and (3) resulting from the commission of
certain other crimes (known today as the felony murder doctrine) were
classified as first degree murders and warranted the death penalty.
All other types of murders not covered by the first degree murder stat-
ute would have fallen under the residual category of second degree
murder.
Since all murders required malice aforethought, applying the
traditional common law, or mens rea, definition of malice, second de-
gree murders would have included killings done (1) with an intent to
kill (but not deliberate or premeditated); (2) with an intent to do seri-
ous bodily harm; or (3) with a "depraved heart" conscious disregard of
an extreme risk to human life.9 5 Apparently, all other killings not
done with malice aforethought would have fallen under the man-
slaughter statute.
In the Third Session of the Legislative Assembly in January 1857,
the entire criminal code was repealed, but no replacement acts were
added.96 The Nebraska Legal Research & Reference Manual indicates
that some evidence showed that members of the legislative council fi-
nagled this repeal to free one member's client who had been charged
with manslaughter. 9 7
The criminal code was not reenacted until late 1858.98 No distinc-
tions were made between degrees of murder; instead, express and im-
plied malice were statutorily defined, and manslaughter was divided
into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
[Murder, generally]
93. Criminal Code, Part Third, ch. 2, §§ 4-6, 12, 1855 Neb. Terr. Laws 255.
94. Id. § 8.
95. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
96. Act of February 13, 1857, Part Second, 1857 Neb. Terr. Laws 137.
97. PAUL F. HILL, NEBRASKA LEGAL RESEARCH & REFERENCE MANUAL § 301, at 44
(1983).
98. Criminal Code, Part First, ch. 1, §§ 19-26, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 41, 43-44.
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§ 19. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be perpetrated
by poisoning, striking, starving, drowning, stabbing, shooting, or by any other
of the various forms or means by which human nature may be overcome and
death thereby occasioned.
[Express Malice]
§ 20. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the
life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capa-
ble of proof.
[Implied Malice]
§ 21. Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or
when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart. The punishment of any person or persons convicted of the crime of
murder shall be death.
[Manslaughter, generally]
§ 22. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice,
express or implied, and without any deliberation whatever. It must be volun-
tary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently suffi-
cient to make the passion irresistible or involuntary, in the commission of an
unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection.
[Voluntary Manslaughter]
§ 23. In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly
provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irre-
sistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person killed to
commit a serious personal injury on the person killing.
§ 24. The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion,
supposed to be irresistible; for if there should appear to have been an interval
between the assault or provocation given and the killing, sufficient for the
voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to
deliberate revenge, and punished as a murder.
[Involuntary Manslaughter]
§ 25. Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being
without any intent so to do, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful
act, which probably might produce such a consequence, in an unlawful man-
ner: Provided, always, That where such involuntary killing shall happen in
the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends
to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a
felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder.
[Punishment for Manslaughter, generally]
§ 26. Every person convicted of the crime of manslaughter shall be punished
by imprisonment to the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten years.9 9
These laws were first codified in the Revised Statutes of the Terri-
tory of Nebraska in 1866.100 Murder and manslaughter were again
distinguished by the presence of malice for murder and the absence of
malice for manslaughter. Although not explicitly clear, the late com-
mon law "specific intentions" understanding of malice also was ex-
pressed in this statutory scheme. The express malice definition
encompassed intent-to-kill murder; the implied malice definition in-
corporated "depraved heart" murder; and the caveat in the involun-
99. Id.
100. NEB. TsaR. RE v. STAT., ch. 4, §§ 18-20, 24 (1866)(§ 18 repealed 1869; §§ 19-20, 24
repealed 1873).
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tary manslaughter statute covered intent-to-do-serious-bodily-harm
murder. The involuntary manslaughter statute distinguished (1) un-
lawful acts (or lawful acts done in an unlawful manner) that carried a
risk of death ("probably might" lead to death) from (2) unlawful acts
that carried a higher risk of death ("naturally tends" to lead to death).
The former constituted involuntary manslaughter and the latter con-
stituted murder. Therefore, a killing that resulted from an intent to
do only bodily harm would be an involuntary or unintentional killing,
but the intentional infliction of serious harm would be an unlawful act
that carried with it a high possibility of death and therefore would be
adjudged murder. In other words, as at common law, malice would be
implied from such dangerous acts, elevating the unintentional killing
to murder.
The 1866 statute also is the origin of the continuing confusion be-
tween what must be proved to establish manslaughter and the way in
which provocation partially excused an intended homicide. First,
manslaughter was the "killing of a human being, without malice."
The statute then described the most typical "without malice" situa-
tion, i.e., provocation, in the remainder of section 22 and in sections 23
and 24. Finally, section 25 defined involuntary manslaughter where a
killing was not intended.
Killings done upon provocation were considered voluntary man-
slaughter. The language in the voluntary manslaughter statute also
indicates the provocation must have caused an "irresistible passion,"
and the killing must quickly follow the provocation in time. It should
be clear, however, that in a situation in which the prosecution believed
the killing to be a result of provocation and so charged manslaughter
in the first instance, the State was not required to prove the provoca-
tion. Rather, the issue of whether or not provocation was present
arose only when the original charge was murder.
This statutory scheme perhaps broadened the manslaughter cate-
gory by specifically including a statutory reference to provoked kill-
ings. At the same time, it broadened the category of killings
punishable by death. Since murder no longer was divided into de-
grees, as long as the killing was done with malice aforethought, the
punishment was death, unlike the first scheme in 1855, in which only
first degree murders were capital offenses.
Over the next seven years, the only change in the homicide law
was an amendment allowing the punishment for murder to be death
or life imprisonment and allowing the jury that tried the case to decide
the penalty.loi In 1873, however, after the territory was granted
statehood, the General Statutes of the State of Nebraska was pub-
lished, codifying the legislative act passed to establish a state criminal
101. Act of Feb. 15, 1869, § 1, 1869 Neb. Laws 94.
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code.102 Murder again was divided into degrees, but malice was not
defined.
[First Degree Murder]
SEC. 3. If any person shall purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated
malice, or in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any rape, arson, rob-
bery, or burglary, or by administering poison, or causing the same to be done,
kill another; or, if any person, by wilful and corrupt perjury, or by subornation
of the same, shall purposely procure the conviction and execution of any inno-
cent person; every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of murder in the
first degree, and, upon conviction thereof, shall suffer death.
[Second Degree Murder]
SEC. 4. If any person shall purposely and maliciously, but without delibera-
tion and premeditation, kill another, every such person shall be deemed guilty
of murder in the second degree; and on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned
in the penitentiary not less than ten years, or during life, in the discretion of
the court.
[Manslaughter]
SEC. 5. If any person shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either
upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commis-
sion of some unlawful act, every such person shall be deemed guilty of man-
slaughter; and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary, not more than ten years, nor less than one year.
1 0 3
Both degrees of murder required the killings to be done purposely
and maliciously. Malice for first degree murder, however, also had to
be deliberate and premeditated. Killings done without malice, either
because the killing was upon a sudden quarrel or was unintentional in
the commission of an unlawful act, were considered manslaughter.
Malice remained the distinguishing factor between murder and man-
slaughter, but the Legislature returned to the murder scheme used in
the first statutes in 1855, designating deliberate and premeditated
malicious killings and killings in the commission of certain other seri-
ous crimes as first degree murder with a potential punishment of
death. Second degree murder again was a residual category for all
other purposeful and malicious killings.
Unfortunately, no statutory definition of malice was supplied, and
the Legislature's understanding of malice at that time was unclear. If
the language indicating that the killing had to be done "purposely" is
interpreted to indicate that the actor had to purposely form one of the
types of common law mens rea known as malice (i.e., the killing must
result from a purposely formed malicious intent), then the late com-
mon law understanding of malice (intent to kill, intent to do serious
bodily harm, or depraved heart) still could have defined types of mens
rea that were necessary for the killing to qualify as murder. If, how-
ever, "purposely" is interpreted more strictly to mean that the killing
had to be done purposely (meaning intentionally), then only killings
done with an intent to kill would be considered murder. Malice would
102. NEB. GEN. STAT., ch. 58, §§ 3-5 (1873)(§ 3 repealed 1893; §§ 4-5 repealed 1977).
103. Id.
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not be implied from killings done with an intent to do serious bodily
harm or with a "depraved heart" conscious disregard of an extreme
risk to human life.
Under this strict interpretation, the late common law understand-
ing of malice could not be employed logically, and it would be reason-
able to assume that the Legislature understood malice as a general
criminal intent-the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just
cause or excuse.1 0 4 This interpretation is consistent with the man-
slaughter statute omitting the distinction regarding the dangerous-
ness of the acts. All unintentional killings were considered
manslaughter, and malice no longer could be implied from certain
dangerous acts to elevate an unintentional killing to murder.l05
If the strict interpretation of the statutory language is followed,
the class of killings deemed murder would be quite restricted-limited
to intentional killings only; the manslaughter statute would be broad-
ened to include all unintentional killings. If "purposely" is read to ap-
ply to the formation of one of the specific malicious intentions, the
number of homicides that would fall under the murder and man-
slaughter statutes would remain relatively consistent with the past.
Under either interpretation, the category of killings that could be pun-
ished by death was restricted to only first degree murders-deliberate
and premeditated killings.
Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter were merged into a sin-
gle statute. All manslaughter was without malice. The terms "provo-
cation" and "heat of passion" were replaced by the phrase "upon a
sudden quarrel." The statutory scheme, however, continued to blur
the partial excuse of provocation and the manslaughter offense. Nev-
ertheless, no reason suggests that the category of manslaughter via
provoked killing was either broadened or narrowed, as perhaps was
the category of unintended homicide.
In 1891, the Consolidated Statutes of Nebraska was published.
The 1891 criminal code recodified all the statutes passed in 1866 that
had not been repealed by subsequent acts and codified all other acts in
force at that time. The language of this statute regarding murder and
malice is identical to the General Statutes of the State of Nebraska.106
Except for a few, minor procedural changes and changes in the ap-
plicability of the death sentence, no other major substantive changes
104. Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 136, 143 (1877).
105. The Nebraska criminal code in 1858 specifically adjudged certain unintentional
killings to be murder. See Criminal Code, Part First, ch. 1, § 25, 1858 Neb. Terr.
Laws 41, 44.
106. NEB. CONSOL. STAT. § 5579(3)-(5) (1891)(§ 5579(3) repealed 1893; § 5580(4)-(5) re-
pealed 1977).
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were made to the homicide laws until 1977.107 It is interesting to
note, however, that some major revisions were proposed and rejected
in 1973.108 The comments following the proposed first degree murder
107. Note the development of the law from 1893 until present. See Act of April 8,
1893, ch. 44, 1893 Neb. Laws 385-86 (adding life imprisonment as a possible pun-
ishment for first degree murder with the choice left to the discretion of the jury);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8581-8583 (1913)(§ 8581 repealed 1963; §§ 8582-8583 re-
pealed 1977); NEB. COMPILED STAT. §§ 9544-9546 (1922)(§ 9544 repealed 1963;
§§ 9545-9546 repealed 1977); NEB. COMPILED STAT. §§ 28-401 to -403 (1929)(§ 28-
401 repealed 1963; §§ 28-402 to -403 repealed 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-401 to
-403 (1943)(§ 28-401 repealed 1963; §§ 28-402 to -403 repealed 1977); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 28-401 to -403 (1948)(§ 28-401 repealed 1963; §§ 28-402 to -403 repealed
1977); Act of June 22, 1963, L.B. 468, 1963 Neb. Laws 529 (indicating the place
where a life sentence is to be served, that the jury will fix the punishment if the
defendant is convicted by the jury's verdict, and that the court will fix the punish-
ment if the defendant pleads guilty); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-401 to -403 (Reissue
1964)(§ 28-401 repealed 1969; §§ 28-402 to -403 repealed 1977); Act of March 19,
1969, L.B. 701, 1969 Neb. Laws 829 (indicating that the court will fix the punish-
ment if the defendant is found guilty at a bench trial); Act of March 24, 1973, L.B.
146, § 2, 1973 Neb. Laws 1-2 (allowing only a sentence of life imprisonment); Act
of April 20, 1973, L.B. 268, § 3, 1973 Neb. Laws 1-2 (reinstating the death penalty
and adding kidnapping and hijacking "of any public or private means of transpor-
tation" to the list of crimes in which death may be imposed); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 28-401 (Supp. 1973)(repealed 1975); Act of May 1, 1975, L.B. 23, § 6, 1975 Neb.
Laws 1-3 (substituting "sexual assault in the first degree" for "rape"); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-401 to -403 (Reissue 1975)(repealed 1977).
108. See JuDICiARY COim. OF THE 84TH NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, WORKING PAPERS AND
PRELIMINARY INTERIM STUDY REPORT ON A REVISED NEBRASKA CRIMINAL CODE,
L.B. 8, vol. 1, §§ 15-17 (1974)(analyzing the provisions of L.B. 8, which was intro-
duced (and rejected) in January 1973).
[First Degree Murder]
Sec. 15. (1) A person commits murder in the first degree if:
(a) With premeditated intent to cause the death of a person other than
himself, he causes the death of the person or another person; or ....
[Second Degree Murder]
Sec. 16. (1) A person commits murder in the second degree if:
(a) He causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premedita-
tion; or
(b) With the intent to cause serious bodily injury to a person other than
himself, he causes the death of such person or of another person; or
(c) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life, he engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
a person other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another
person.
[Manslaughter]
Sec. 17. (1) A person commits manslaughter if:
(a) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He commits a homicide, which would otherwise be murder, while
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness
of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of
a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.
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statute indicate that the previous statute included "purposely" or "de-
liberate" and "premeditated malice" as the mens rea element, and that
this seemingly would not qualify as a "significant" substantive change.
No explanation is given as to why the author of the comment felt that
the term "premeditated intent" in the proposed statute was the
equivalent of the term "premeditated malice" referred to in the com-
ment or why this was not substantively different. The comment relat-
ing to the second degree murder revision points out the replacement of
"purposely" and "maliciously" with "intentionally" and indicates that
the second and third clauses are entirely new and would broaden the
scope of the crime of second degree murder. Interestingly, this scheme
describes the typical late common law understanding of malice-in-
tent to kill, intent to do serious bodily harm, and depraved heart. The
comments for manslaughter point out that the revision would broaden
the scope of the manslaughter statute, especially the second clause,
which allows extreme mental or emotional disturbance to reduce a
murder to manslaughter. In 1977, the Legislature made minor
changes to the wording of the first degree murder statute; but, more
importantly, the second degree murder statute no longer stated that
the killing had to be done purposely and maliciously.10 9 The statutes
have not changed since 1977. The present statutes are as follows:
28-303. Murder in the first degree; penalty. A person commits murder in
the first degree if he kills another person (1) purposely and with deliberate
and premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate
any sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking of
any public or private means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by adminis-
tering poison or causing the same to be done; or if by willful and corrupt per-
jury or subornation of the same he purposely procures the conviction and
execution of any innocent person. The determination of whether murder in
the first degree shall be punished as a Class I or Class IA felony shall be made
pursuant to sections 29-2520 to 29-2524.
28-304. Murder in the second degree; penalty. (1) A person commits mur-
der in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but
without premeditation. (2) Murder in the second degree is a Class [B felony.
28-305. Manslaughter; penalty. (1) A person commits manslaughter if he
kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the
death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act.
(2) Manslaughter is a Class DII felony.1 10
The change to the second degree murder statute, which omitted
the word "maliciously," created much debate as to whether the ele-
Id.
109. Act of June 1, 1977, L.B. 38, §§ 18-20, 1977 Neb. Laws 88, 97.
110. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-303, -305 (Reissue 1995).
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ment of malice is still required.' 1 ' Substituting "intentionally" for
"purposely" rectified the previous interpretation problem-the statute
itself now made it clear that second degree murder must be done in-
tentionally. The late common law understanding of malice as specific
intentions to kill, do grievous bodily harm, or act with a "depraved
heart" conscious disregard of an extreme risk to human life is not ap-
posite in Nebraska's second degree murder law; malice must be under-
stood in the more general sense of criminal intent as the "intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse." 112 The remain-
der of the reenacted homicide statutes were almost identical to the
1873 statutes.
B. The Cases
As early as 1877, malice in Nebraska homicide case law was de-
fined as "[t]he doing [sic] a wrongful act intentionally without just
cause or excuse."1 13 From the beginning until the present, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has consistently defined malice, using minor
variations of "intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse," and sometimes adding "a willful or corrupt intention of the
mind" to the definition.114 This is the old understanding of malice as a
general criminal intent. Many other states apparently adopted the
late English common law specific intentions understanding of malice
(intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily harm, and depraved
heart).1 5 In Nebraska, however, no cases seem to exist in which the
court has ever been asked to define malice as a specific intent, in
which the court has ever done so on its own initiative, or in which
anyone has ever challenged the sufficiency of this early common law
definition of malice.
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has uniformly considered
malice to be a general criminal intent, only recently has the court
given it any critical bite that would make a difference in result in a
homicide case. Older cases are devoid of in-depth discussion of the
definition of malice other than to assume malice meant a general
111. See generally State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 543 N.W.2d 128 (1996); State v. Myers,
244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994); State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 519 N.W.2d
507 (1994).
112. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 885, 523 N.W.2d 681, 693 (1994)(citation omitted).
113. Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 136, 143 (1877).
114. See State v. White, 249 Neb. 381, 383, 543 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1996)(currently de-
fining malice as "that condition of the mind shown by 'intentionally doing a
wrongfil act without just cause or excuse'-a 'willful or corrupt intention of the
mind'); Beers v. State, 24 Neb. 614, 618, 39 N.W. 790, 792 (1888)(previously stat-
ing that "[malice, in its legal sense, denotes that condition of one's mind which is
manifested by his intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.
It means any willful or corrupt intention of the mind.").
115. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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criminal intent. These older cases never reached the question of how
malice would operate to distinguish second degree murder from man-
slaughter. Jury instructions on presumptions of malice, which existed
from the 1800s through the early 1900s, made an explicit discussion
even less imperative. Malice could be presumed in two situations:
from the mere fact that there was a killing, 16 and from the use of a
deadly weapon, if, in either case, the defendant presented no evidence
"which throws a different light on the situation or which establishes
exculpating or mitigating circumstances.""i 7 In no other cases could ajury instruction be given that directed the jury to presume malice
when no evidence of excuse, justification, or alleviation existed."i8
Therefore, much of the discussion in the early cases dealt with
116. Preuit v. People, 5 Neb. 377, 384 (1877)(stating that the rule in Nebraska is that
"where the fact of killing is established, and there is no explanatory circumstance
proven, malice is presumed, and the crime is murder"); Milton v. State, 6 Neb.
136, 138 (1877). See also Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 N.W. 713 (1899);
Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N.W. 984 (1897); Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40
N.W. 420 (1888); Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241, 1 N.W. 857 (1879), rev'd on
other grounds, 9 Neb. 300, 2 N.W. 710 (1879); Williams v. State, 6 Neb. 334
(1877).
117. Quijas v. State, 133 Neb. 410, 275 N.W. 588 (1937). See also Chauncey E. Bar-
ney, Homicide-Malice-Presumption of Malice from Use of Deadly Weapon, 17
NEB. L. BuLL. 231, 233 (1938).
118. Remember that it was not until the latter half of this century that the United
States Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded in a series of
cases that jury instructions on presumptions are unconstitutional. See In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(finding that the Constitution requires the State to
prove every fact essential to establish the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)(finding jury instructions uncon-
stitutional if they cause a jury to believe that the burden of persuasion is shifted
to the defendant); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)(finding unconsti-
tutional a jury instruction in which the jury could have concluded that if the
State proved the existence of the killing and additional facts that did not by
themselves establish the intent element, that the burden to prove the lack of in-
tent was shifted to the defendant); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)(find-
ing a jury instruction on a mandatory rebuttable presumption unconstitutional
because it relieved the State of the burden of persuasion as to the presumed ele-
ment when it instructed the jury that it must find the element unless the defend-
ant presented evidence that persuaded the jury otherwise; permissive inferences,
however, were found to be constitutional because the State was still required to
persuade the jury that the element reasonably could be inferred from the proven
facts, and the jury had the choice to accept or reject the suggested conclusion);
State v. Parks, 245 Neb. 205, 209-11, 571 N.W.2d 774, 777-79 (1994)(adopting the
United States Supreme Court rulings, holding that "[a] jury instruction which
shifts the burden of proof to a defendant on any essential element of a crime
charged violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial," and that "when a
trial court instructs a jury on an inference regarding a specific fact or set of facts,
the instruction must include that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient
evidence of the inferred fact, but that the jury is not required to do so and that, in
any event, the existence of the inferred fact must, on all the evidence, be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt").
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whether or not it was appropriate to give an instruction directing the
jury to presume malice on the facts of the case,1 19 and no other compli-
cations surrounding the element of malice seemed to exist.
It was not until 1994, in State v. Myers, that the real controversy
with malice started. Recall that by this time the current statutes were
in force, and second degree murder no longer required a killing to be
done "maliciously," but only "intentionally."120 In Myers, the defend-
ant was convicted of second degree murder, and the jury was not in-
structed on the element of malice. The Nebraska Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that the law continued to require malice as an ele-
ment of second degree murder, and the failure of the trial court judge
to instruct the jury on that element was reversible error.12 1 Ironi-
cally, malice was never defined in Myers.
In State v. Ryan,1 22 the majority defended the decision in Myers,
giving a clearer justification for continuing to require the element of
malice when the statute is entirely silent on the element.
Without the element of malice or mens rea,... the second degree murder
statute of which Ryan was convicted, would be of doubtful validity and per-
haps unconstitutional. Through acceptable statutory construction principles,
we have held and continue to hold that under § 28-304(1), malice is a neces-
sary element of second degree murder. By such statutory construction, there
can be no question of § 28-304(1)s validity.
• . . Legislative silence as to a mental element in a crime already so well
defined in common law and statutory interpretation is not to be construed as
eliminating that element from the crime....
... Construing the legislative silence of § 28-304(1) as eliminating malice
as a material element of second degree murder would result in the absurd
consequence of an overbroad murder statute making certain legal acts illegal.
119. See Kennison v. State, 80 Neb. 688, 115 N.W. 289 (1908).
120. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
121. 244 Neb. 905, 908-09, 510 N.W.2d 58, 63 (1994)(citing State v. Rowe, 214 Neb.
685, 335 N.W.2d 309 (1983)(convicting the defendant of second degree murder for
a killing done after the enactment of the new statute, in which the court held that
elements of second degree murder require that the killing be done purposely and
maliciously)). See also State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931, 531 N.W.2d 222 (1995);
State v. Williams, 243 Neb. 959, 966, 503 N.W.2d 561, 566 (1993)(stating that
"purposely" means "intentionally"); State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 375, 399, 507
N.W.2d 253, 270 (1993)(stating that "purposely" means "intentionally"); State v.
Franklin, 241 Neb. 579, 489 N.W.2d 552 (1992); State v. Dean, 237 Neb. 65, 464
N.W.2d 782 (1991); State v. Illig, 237 Neb. 598, 467 N.W.2d 375 (1991); State v.
Ettleman, 229 Neb. 220, 425 N.W.2d 894 (1988); State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494,
432 N.W.2d 503 (1988); State v. Moniz, 224 Neb. 198, 397 N.W.2d 37 (1986);
State v. Clermont, 204 Neb. 611, 284 N.W.2d 412 (1979)(involving a murder for
which the defendant was convicted, and which was committed three weeks after
the enactment of the new statute, yet the court continued to hold that for second
degree murder, the killing had to have been done purposely and maliciously).
122. 249 Neb. 218, 227-28, 543 N.W.2d 128, 137 (1996).
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If malice is not read into § 28-304(1), these individuals [law enforcement offi-
cials forced to kill in the line of duty, corrections employees or agents forced to
carry out a criminal's death sentence, prosecutors who successfully persuade a
court to sentence the defendant to death, Nebraska's Board of Pardons who
may turn down a request to reduce a sentence of a defendant awaiting execu-
tion] carrying out state duties would be in violation of that statute unless the
statute is properly construed.
... Such persons would have to defend themselves through an affirmative
defense or justification.... This results in a shifting of the State's burden of
proving every element of the crime charged in a criminal case. As a practical
matter, the defendant would be forced to forego his or her presumption of in-
nocence and be required to produce evidence that he or she in causing the
death of a person acted lawfully.123
Despite the language of the majority opinion, a division among the
court began to emerge with a strong dissent by Judge Gerrard, who
was joined by Judges Wright and Connolly. The dissent asserted that
[tihe Legislature is presumed to have known the preexisting law, and in en-
acting an amendatory statute, we are compelled to conclude that the language
was intentionally changed for the purpose of effecting a change in the law
itself ...
... By removing malice from the statutory text of only the second degree
murder statute, the Legislature acted affirmatively with the intention of
changing only the second degree murder statute and eliminating malice as an
element of that particular crime.124
Judge Gerrard also pointed out that the Nebraska Legislature had
recently statutorily defined several affirmative defenses that require
the defendant to initially produce evidence to raise the defense (more
than just a "scintilla" of evidence will suffice). But, after the defend-
ant has done so, the burden shifts to the State to disprove the defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.125 The elimination of malice from second
degree murder, Gerrard claimed, was an effort to relieve the prosecu-
tion of the unnecessary burden of disproving justifications or defenses
when they were not first raised as an issue by the defendant.126
In attacking the majority's claim that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, Gerrard maintained that section 28-1408, which
justifies the use of force in the execution of a public duty, would re-
quire the State to "prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such public
officer was acting outside his or her duties or functions or outside the
judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal," and that malice,
accordingly, does not need to be a required element to protect public
officials.12 7 Finally, Gerrard reasoned that even without malice as an
element of second degree murder, intent would still have to be proved
123. Id. at 223-27, 543 N.W.2d at 135-37 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 243-44, 543 N.W.2d at 145-46 (Gerrard, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
125. Id. at 244, 543 N.W.2d at 146.
126. Id. at 245-46, 543 N.W.2d at 146-47.
127. Id. at 247, 543 N.W.2d at 147-48.
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as a mens rea element. The element of intent was not absent without
malice as an element since the jury still must find that the murder
was done intentionally-with the "requisite criminal intent."' 2s Also,
the requirement that the defendant raise the affirmative defense of
justification is not an unconstitutional shifting of the State's burden of
proof since it is the burden of persuasion, not production, that cannot
be shifted to the defendant.129
Perhaps not surprisingly, the court's unanimous opinion in Myers
resulted in the strongly divided court in Ryan and has sparked intense
commentary. Nebraska's Attorney General, Don Stenberg, recently
argued that the supreme court overstepped its powers by requiring
malice as an element in the second degree murder statute.i 30
By adding an element to the crime of second degree murder, the Nebraska
Supreme Court ignored long-standing precedent concerning statutory con-
struction. It also usurped the authority of the legislative branch, ignoring the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers and depriving the citizens of
Nebraska of their right to a republican form of government under the United
States Constitution.
1 3 1
Attorney General Stenberg attempted to refute the supreme court's
constitutional justification for requiring malice in the statute, stating
the statute as written was not at all ambiguous. If the clear language
was in fact unconstitutional, then it was the court's responsibility to
find it so, but not to rewrite "the statute to conform with its own image
of second degree murder."1 32 Under the Nebraska Constitution, defin-
ing the elements of a criminal offense is the function of the legislature,
not the judiciary.1 3 3
An extensive examination of the majority and minority opinions in
the recent cases dealing with the judicial requirement of malice as an
element of second degree murder was undertaken by Professor Rich-
ard E. Shugrue.i 34 By approaching the problem on constitutional
criminal procedure grounds, Shugrue generally concluded that the mi-
nority, which purported that malice was not intended to be an element
of the statute and was not a necessary element, had made a more per-
suasive case.135 He pointed out, however, that the United States
Supreme Court decisions dealing with these complicated due process
issues have confounded courts and scholars alike, and yet the state
courts are still left with the tough job of applying the rules.' 36 He
128. Id. at 248, 543 N.W.2d at 148.
129. Id. at 250-51, 543 N.W.2d at 149-50 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
210 (1977)).
130. Stenberg, supra note 9.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Id. at 21.
134. Shugrue, supra note 11.
135. Id. at 30.
136. Id. at 65-66.
[Vol. 76:399
MALICE IN NEBRASKA
closed his article with a suggestion to the Nebraska majority to re-
trace its steps and reach the correct conclusion in future cases.13 7
Despite the advice, the Nebraska Supreme Court has not back-
tracked. A great deal of water has now passed under the Myers
bridge, carrying the reversals of many second degree murder convic-
tions and the promise of fidelity to law. Malice, the intentional doing
of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, is one of the required
mens rea elements of second degree murder. Questions remain, how-
ever, about the substance of Nebraska homicide law and the still elu-
sive distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter.
IV. PUZZLES OF NEBRASKA HOMICIDE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Problem of State v. Dean: What Is the Mens Rea for
Second Degree Murder?
The traditional relationship between malice and intention has tended to in-
hibit careful judicial elaboration of the notion of intentional killing.1 38
State v. Dean139 offers a clear manifestation of the problem of find-
ing the necessary mens rea for second degree murder. Malice is the
mens rea element that separates second degree murder from man-
slaughter, and careful consideration is required to avoid either a dis-
torted view of the facts or a misshapen measuring stick.140 Following
a bench trial, JaRon Dean was found guilty of second degree murder.
On appeal, Dean argued that the trial judge had failed to specify a
finding of malice and that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of an intention to kill.
The evidence showed Dean and several other young men had been
supplied with weapons by one person in their party. The group then
drove to the trailer house of the decedent, Deron Haynes. One man in
Dean's party had been in an argument earlier that day with Haynes.
When the group arrived at Haynes' trailer, two automobiles were
parked nearby, positioned with the car lights shining on the middle
portion of the trailer. Dean's party drove by and then returned. On
their return, only one car remained parked by the trailer, but the
lights still illuminated the middle section of the trailer. Each member
of Dean's group selected a weapon provided, and then all shot into the
lighted trailer. Haynes' body was found inside, the fatal bullet coming
from the weapon fired by Dean. Once in custody, Dean confessed to
137. Id. at 66.
138. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHNKIG CRnmAL LAw 259 (1978).
139. 246 Neb. 869, 523 N.W.2d 681 (1994). A reading of Dean also reminds one of
Mansell and Herbert's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (KB. 1558). See supra notes 73-74.
Mansell and Herbert's Case was a leading case in the development of the notion of
implied malice, i.e., the intent to do grievous bodily harm or to act with a "de-
praved heart." Such notions are not part of the Nebraska law of malice.
140. James W. McElhaney, Briefs That Sing, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 80.
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shooting into the trailer, but stated that although he knew the trailer
had been occupied earlier that evening, he did not believe anyone was
in the trailer at the time he fired his weapon. He also claimed to have
shot high to avoid hitting anyone who might have been inside.'4i
The trial court agreed with the defendant to make specific findings,
but failed to state specifically that Dean had acted with malice. The
trial court did state that the "killing of the decedent was intentionally
done in that it was done willfully or purposefully and not accidentally
or involuntarily."' 42 The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that mal-
ice, "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or ex-
cuse,"'143 was established, and that it would not reverse when the trial
court, acting as finder of fact, "neglected" to mention the mental state
that was sufficiently identified by other findings implying its
presence.144
Dean also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove an
intention to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. The supreme court re-
jected this argument by pointing to the testimony of two other partici-
pants at the scene. One witness "thought he saw someone in the
window of the trailer and said so, but was unsure whether anyone
heard him." Another witness "saw someone peek out from the front
window before he and other participants parked their automobile and
handed out the guns."' 4 5 According to the court, such testimony was
"direct evidence that someone was inside the trailer." 46 The court
concluded "that evidence that one, intentionally and with malice, shot
into a residence, lighted or unlighted, and that a death resulted is, in
and of itself, sufficient to establish murder in the second degree."' 47
The court's strong declaration in Dean cannot be correct. And, it
demonstrates the potential confusion of the double mens rea require-
ment of second degree murder. In Nebraska, second degree murder
requires both an intention to kill and malice, a condition of the mind
that is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse 1 48
In a jurisdiction where malice is a substitute for the specific mental
states of (1) intent to kill, (2) intent to do grievous bodily harm, or (3)
"depraved heart" conscious disregard of extreme risk to human life,
141. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 871-73, 523 N.W.2d 681, 686-87 (1994).
142. Id. at 884, 523 N.W.2d at 693.
143. Id. at 885, 523 N.W.2d at 693.
144. Id. at 885-86, 523 N.W.2d at 694.
145. Id. at 887, 523 N.W.2d at 695.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 888.
148. See State v. Franklin, 241 Neb. 579,585,489 N.W.2d 552, 558 (1992); Whitehead
v. State, 115 Neb. 143, 212 N.W. 35 (1927); Robert S. Hinds, Note, Criminal
Law-Homicide-Is Purpose or an Intent an Indispensable Element of Murder in
Nebraska?, 33 Nsa. L. Rav. 481 (1954).
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any one of the mental states will suffice to prove murder. In Ne-
braska, however, second degree murder may be established only by
proving an intent to kill and that the intent to kill is accompanied by
malice, an additional condition of the mind that seems to indicate that
the intention to kill is neither justified nor excused by a legally recog-
nized defense or a fact-finder's recognition that the actor had some
other nonlegally recognized excuse or justification.1 49 The court's
"here and now" declaration in Dean may confuse the two separate
mens rea requirements of second degree murder.
The court believed it was obvious that the trial judge must have
found the required malice because Dean purposely shot into a trailer
when there was a car nearby, and he did not offer any sort of excuse or
justification.o5 0 It does seem clear that this was an act done with the
general criminal intent notion of malice. On the other hand, it seems
less clear that Dean intended to kill anyone. And, to this writer, it
seems as if the presence of malice, the general criminal intent mani-
fested by the absence of any excuse or justification, distorted both the
factual conclusion of an intention to kill and confused the focus of the
intention-to fire a weapon into a dwelling or to kill someone.
In State v. Franklin,151 the defendant, in a bench trial, was con-
victed of second degree murder as a result of shooting into the door of
a house after seeing a person in a window three or four feet from the
door. The defendant claimed that he was "just trying to scare [the
decedent]." The prosecution in Franklin argued that Nebraska's sec-
ond degree murder statute did not require an intention to kill, and
"firing of a gun into a house where the shooter knows there are people
constitutes, in itself, second degree murder."1 52 The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected both propositions. The court stated it always
had held that second degree murder requires an intention to kill.153
Moreover, the court held that firing into a house known to be occupied
may constitute second degree murder if the fact-finder infers an intent
to kill from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reason-
ably likely to cause death.54
Certainly the court's declaration in Dean is, at the least, overstated
and inconsistent with Franklin. Suppose an actor intentionally shoots
into a house where she, perhaps unreasonably, believes no one to be,
and she does so with a general criminal intent, i.e., without any of-
fered excuse or justification. Someone dies. Second degree murder, or
149. State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 543 N.W.2d 128 (1996); State v. White, 249 Neb.
381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996).
150. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 885, 523 N.W.2d 681, 693 (1994).
151. 241 Neb. 579, 489 N.W.2d 552 (1992).
152. Id. at 582, 584, 489 N.W.2d at 555-56.
153. Id. at 585, 489 N.W.2d at 556. Franklin is also one of those cases in which the
court recites the necessity of malice, but does not develop the concept.
154. Id. at 584, 586, 489 N.W.2d at 556-57.
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manslaughter? An intentional killing with malice or a killing without
malice? Unintentional while in the commission of an unlawful act?
Read again the court's declaration in Dean. "Indeed, we declare here
and now that evidence that one, intentionally and with malice, shot
into a residence, lighted or unlighted, and that a death resulted is, in
and of itself, sufficient to establish murder in the second degree."'155 If
one intentionally shoots into a house, and this intentional shooting
into a house lacks any offer of an excuse or justification, and a death
results, that is second degree murder, an intentional killing with
malice.
If the first declaration seems plausible and the second does not, it
perhaps is due to the weight that "malice" carries in the first declara-
tion. That weight, of course, is the idea of malice as a conceptual sub-
stitute for the distinct mental states of an intent to kill, to do grievous
bodily harm, or to act with a "depraved heart" in conscious disregard
of a extreme risk to human life. But, the second degree murder law of
Nebraska does not use "malice" in that way, and both judges and ju-
ries need to be aware of the possible confusion the symbol may cause.
Commonwealth v. Malone15 6 is the classic case of "depraved heart"
second degree murder. Almost every lawyer and judge either has read
or encountered Malone as a case or hypothetical in law school. In Ma-
lone, two youths were sitting in a dairy store, and Malone suggested
that they play "Russian Poker." The decedent consented, and Malone
placed his revolver to the decedent's side and pulled the trigger three
times. Malone claimed to have loaded the revolver with one bullet so
that it would not fire with only three pulls.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Malone's conviction of
second degree murder. The court did not reject Malone's version of the
facts and did not find an intent to kill. Rather, the court turned to
malice, the "grand criterion" of murder. Malice was present in Ma-
lone's "gross recklessness," "wicked, depraved, and malignant heart,"
and "reckless and wanton disregard of the consequences." Further,
the court referred to Blackstone's example of murder, "coolly discharg-
ing a gun among a multitude of people."' 5 7 Could it be that the mem-
ory of Malone remains with the Nebraska judiciary and bar? If so, it
must also be remembered as inapposite to Nebraska law.158
155. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 888, 523 N.W.2d 681, 695 (1994).
156. 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1946).
157. Id. at 447.
158. The confusion between "malice" as a symbol for specific mental intentions on one
hand, and a general criminal intent without any excuse or justification on the
other, is not new. Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N.W. 984 (1897), is an early
example and may be the closest the Nebraska Supreme Court has ever come to
recognizing "depraved heart" second degree murder. Davis derailed a train and
caused a death, but claimed to have intended only to signal the train to stop
before the derailment and then collect a reward from the passengers. Yet, the
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It is of course true that an intention to kill may be inferred from
the facts. More particularly, an intent to kill may be inferred from the
use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause
death.159 State v. Rokus 16o is similar to the situation in Malone.
Rokus shot the decedent Joseph Kashuba in the head, at point-blank
range, with a .44 magnum. Rokus provided three different versions of
the facts of the killing, but all three versions explained that he was
"just joking around."' 6 A jury found Rokus guilty of second degree
murder, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death
may be the basis for an inference of the required intent to kill.162
It should be emphasized that an actor's use of a deadly weapon in a
manner reasonably likely to cause death may be the factual basis for
inferring an answer to two distinct questions: (1) do the actions prove
a "depraved heart" conscious disregard of extreme risk to human life?;
or (2) do the actions prove an intent to kill? Only the second question
is germane to second degree murder in Nebraska. Any unintended
death, no matter how wanton, reckless, or depraved, might be the risk
in doing the act that caused a death, which in Nebraska would consti-
tute manslaughter, an unintended death while in the commission of
an unlawful act.163 But, an unintended death during perpetration or
attempted perpetration of the statutorily identified felonies-sexual
assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, or
burglary-would constitute first degree felony murder.164 An ironic
symmetry thus ensues: no matter how little the risk of an unintended
death during a named felony, it is first degree murder, and no matter
how big the risk of an unintended death during any other unlawful
act, it is manslaughter. Second degree murder sits in the middle, re-
quiring both an intent to kill and malice, the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse.
In State v. Hansen,165 the defendant appealed a bench trial convic-
tion of first degree murder. Of interest is the trial judge's factual con-
clusion, affirmed on appeal, that Hansen intended to kill when he fired
decision in Davis may simply turn on a jury finding that Davis was not to be
believed and that his intent was to kill. Id. at 311, 70 N.W. at 987.
159. State v. Rokus, 240 Neb. 613, 622, 483 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1992); State v. Franklin,
241 Neb. 579, 586, 489 N.W.2d 552, 557 (1992). See generally Walter E. Oberer,
The Deadly Weapon Doctrine-Common Law Origin, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1565
(1962); Note, Criminal Law-Deadly Weapon Doctrine, 34 Ky. L.J. 320 (1946).
160. 240 Neb. 613, 483 N.W.2d 149 (1992).
161. Id. at 619, 483 N.W.2d at 153.
162. Id. at 622, 483 N.W.2d at 155.
163. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-305 (Reissue 1995). An unintended death resulting from
the operation of a motor vehicle might be prosecuted alternatively as motor vehi-
cle homicide. Id. § 28-306.
164. Id. § 28-303.
165. 252 Neb. 489, 562 N.W.2d 840 (1997).
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from an automobile a 20-gauge shotgun loaded with 3/4 ounce "deer
slugs," at a distance of approximately fifteen feet from a group in
which the victim was standing. Hansen claimed that he used deer
slugs to reduce the chance of accidentally hitting anyone because the
slug consisted of only one large piece of metal, rather than many BBs
in a regular shotgun shell. Hansen testified that he intended only to
"scare the shit out of' the group when he fired and purposely shot "up
in the air."166
The supreme court stated that intent to kill may be inferred from
the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.167 In
addition, either Hansen or members of his group had stated that they
wanted to kill some members in the group and that they used the deer
slugs to do some damage.16s Following this reasoning, the supreme
court affirmed a finding of not only an intent to kill, but also that it
was deliberate and premeditated.169
The facts of Franklin, Rokus, and Hansen all resulted in a finding
that an actor who fired a deadly weapon had an intent to kill. They all
rely on the notion that such an intent may be inferred from the delib-
erate use of the weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death.
The most striking difference between the manner of the weapon's use
in State v. Dean and the cases just discussed is that in Franklin,
Rokus, and Hansen the weapons were fired at people known to be
present by the shooter. Franklin knew someone was in the house;
Rokus knew he was "joking around" with someone; Hansen knew he
was firing in the direction of a group standing on the corner. Perhaps
JaRon Dean should have reasonably expected someone to be in the
trailer house, but the evidence was insufficient to show Dean knew
someone was there.17o Perhaps the risk he took was wanton, de-
praved, or reckless. Even so, this would result only in manslaughter
liability. Perhaps, but only perhaps, a fact-finder could conclude be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill.
Second degree murder requires two mens rea elements. The actor
must intend to kill, and the actor must act with malice, without any
justification or excuse. Just as an intent to kill does not mean the
actor necessarily acted with malice, acting without a justification or
excuse of any kind, or with a "depraved heart" consciousness of an
166. Id. at 494-95, 562 N.W.2d at 846.
167. Id. at 501, 562 N.W.2d at 850.
168. Id. at 495, 562 N.W.2d at 846.
169. Id. at 501, 503, 562 N.W.2d 850-51.
170. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 885, 887, 523 N.W.2d 681, 693, 695 (1994). The
court noted the testimony of two witnesses who thought they had seen someone
in the trailer. The court stated this was direct evidence someone was present. Of
course, the body of the victim is also direct evidence someone was there, but the
court did not affirm any finding of Dean's knowledge other than stating that he
reasonably could have expected someone to be there.
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extreme risk to human life, does not necessarily mean the actor in-
tended to kill. Judges, juries, and lawyers need to be aware of the
potential for confusion when both of these distinct mental states are to
be inferred from the underlying facts of a killing.
B. The Problem of State v. Jones: May an Intentional
Homicide Be Manslaughter?
Intentional killings are ranked in ascending order from manslaughter, to sec-
ond-degree murder, to first-degree murder. 17 1
State v. Jones172 is the latest in a series of Nebraska cases dealing
with the problem of distinguishing the mens rea of second degree mur-
der from the mens rea of voluntary manslaughter. Jones overruled
State v. Pettit,17 3 which had overruled State v. Batiste.174 Jones17 5
leaves unclear the question of whether or not a provoked killing, the
quintessential case of voluntary manslaughter, may properly be man-
slaughter if the provoked actor intended to kill. Moreover, the "acquit-
tal first" "step" instruction used in Jones is imbued with problems
when combined with instructions defining provocation and malice, but
neglecting to tell juries what to do with the concepts.
Roy Jones was charged with first degree murder and convicted by a
jury of second degree murder for the death of his wife, Tara Jones.
Jones killed his wife after several days of escalating argument, which
culminated in Tara dying from two shots to her head. The defendant
claimed that Tara pointed a gun at him, they struggled, and then he
"snapped." A witness saw Tara running away from a window of the
house and a hand clinging to a gun extending from the window. The
witness heard approximately four shots. Tara staggered and fell.176
On appeal Jones argued that the trail court's step instructions im-
properly prevented the jury from considering a voluntary manslaugh-
ter conviction. Step instructions are both common and critical.
Consequently, the entire Instruction No. 6 will be set forth here.
Under Count 1 of the Information in this case, depending on the evidence,
you may find the defendant
A. Guilty of murder in the first degree; or
B. Guilty of murder in the second degree; or
C. Guilty of voluntary manslaughter; or
D. Not guilty.
171. FLrrcHER, supra note 138, at 256.
172. 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994).
173. 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989).
174. 231 Neb. 481, 477 N.W.2d 125 (1989). The history of Batiste and Pettit may be
found in Veronica L. Bowen, Comment, Intent as an Element of Voluntary Man-
slaughter: State v. Pettit, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 583 (1991).
175. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994).
176. Id. at 822-25, 515 N.W.2d at 654-56.
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The material elements which the State must prove by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime of murder in
the first degree in Count 1 are:
1. That the defendant, Roy L. Jones, killed Tara L. Jones;
2. That the defendant, did so purposely and with deliberate and premedi-
tated malice;
3. That the defendant did so on or about March 30, 1992; and
4. That the defendant did so in Douglas County, Nebraska.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every one of the foregoing material elements of the crime of murder in the first
degree necessary for conviction.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the
foregoing material elements is true, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty
of the crime of murder in the first degree in Count 1, and you shall complete
Verdict Form 1, and you shall not then consider the next lesser-included of-
fense hereafter set forth in the instruction. On the other hand, if you find that
the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the
foregoing material elements, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of
the crime of murder in the first degree in Count 1. You shall then proceed to
consider the lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree.
The material elements which the State must prove by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime of murder in
the second degree are:
1. That the defendant, Roy L. Jones, killed Tara L. Jones;
2. That the defendant did so intentionally but without premeditation.
3. That the defendant did so on or about March 30, 1992; and
4. That the defendant did so in Douglas County, Nebraska.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every one of the foregoing material elements of the crime of murder in the
second degree necessary for conviction.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the
foregoing material elements is true, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty
of the crime of murder in the second degree in Count 1, and you shall complete
Verdict Form 2, and you shall not then consider the next lesser included of-
fense hereinafter set forth in this instruction. On the other hand, if you find
the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the
foregoing material elements, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of
the crime of murder in the second degree in Count 1. You shall then proceed
to consider the next lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
The material elements which the state must prove by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter are:
1. That the defendant, Roy L. Jones, killed Tara L. Jones;
2. That the defendant did, without malice, kill Tara L. Jones intentionally
upon a sudden quarrel;
3. That the defendant did so on or about March 30, 1992; and
4. That the defendant did so in Douglas County, Nebraska.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every one of the foregoing material elements of the crime of voluntary man-
slaughter necessary for conviction.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the
foregoing material elements is true, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty
of the crime of voluntary manslaughter in County 1; and you shall complete
Verdict Form 1. On other [sic] hand, if you find the State has failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the foregoing material ele-
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ments, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter and not guilty of any charge in the case in Count 1, and you
shall complete Verdict Form 4.
The burden of proof is always on the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the material elements of the crime charged or included therein,
and the burden never shifts. 1 7 7
Instruction No. 6 needs to be placed in the context of two other
instructions, No. 11 and No. 12.
[No. 111
The Nebraska Criminal Code in full force and effect at the time alleged in
the Information pertaining to the crime of voluntary manslaughter provides
in substance as follows:
"(1) A person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice...
upon a sudden quarrel... [.J"
"Malice" is defined as that condition of the mind which is shown by inten-
tionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. It means any will-
ful or corrupt intention of mind.
[No. 12]
A sudden quarrel is a legally recognized and sufficient provocation which
causes a reasonable person to lose normal self control.
The phrase "sudden quarrel" does not necessarily mean an exchange of
angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with an unlawful killing and
does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact be-
tween the defendant and Tara Jones.
In considering the offense of voluntary manslaughter, you should deter-
mine whether the defendant acted under the impulse of passion suddenly
aroused which clouded reason and prevented rational action, whether there
existed reasonable and adequate provocation to excite the passion of the de-
fendant and obscure and disturb his power of reasoning to the extent that he
acted rashly and from passion, without due deliberation and reflection, rather
than from judgment, and whether under all the facts and circumstances as
disclosed in the evidence, a reasonable time had elapsed from the time of prov-
ocation to the instant of the killing for the passion to subside and reason re-
sume control of the mind.
You should determine whether the suspension of reason, if shown to exist,
arising from sudden passion, continued from the time of provocation until the
very instant of the act producing death took place.
Therefore, if the evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant killed Tara Jones intentionally upon a sudden quarrel, you
should find him guilty of the offense of manslaughter.1 7 8
Jones argued that the second degree murder step in the instruc-
tions asked if the kiling was done intentionally. Jones' argument fol-
lowed that if the jury answered yes, they would end the matter at that
point. Consequently, they would not consider the possibility that
Jones intentionally killed his wife, but that the intention to kill was
the result of a reasonable and adequate provocation and therefore con-
177. Id. at 825-28, 515 N.W.2d at 656-58.
178. Id. at 831-32, 515 N.W.2d at 659-60.
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stituted voluntary manslaughter.17 9 The court answered that the
step instruction was simply a logical way to proceed and that the jury
was not required in its preliminary deliberations to be unanimous
before considering whether the defendant was guilty of a lesser
offense.180
The court did recognize, however, that instruction No. 6 "effectively
negated"'S' the possibility of a manslaughter conviction, but blamed
the problem on State v. Pettit. 182 The court found that under Pettit, a
conviction of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel required the killer
to act with an intention to kill. Under the current Nebraska statutes,
however,
second degree murder is the intentional killing of another without premedita-
tion. Manslaughter is the killing of another without malice, upon a sudden
quarrel, or an unintentional killing while in the commission of an unlawful
act.
Malice has most recently been defined in our cases as "that condition of the
mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse."...
Since our statutes define manslaughter as a killing without malice, there
is no requirement of an intention to kill in committing manslaughter. The
distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden
quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill. State v. Pettit, 233
Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989), was incorrect in its reasoning and holding,
and to that extent, it is overruled. 1 8
3
After proceeding to this point, the court abruptly shifted gears
away from the provocation-intentional killing issue. Instruction No. 6
was plain error and prejudicial since it failed to include malice as a
necessary element of second degree murder. The judgment was re-
versed and remanded.18 4
The court returned to the provocation problem, but never ad-
dressed Jones' argument that instructions No. 11 and No. 12 confuse
or fail to explicate the relationship of malice and sudden quarrel, a
legally recognized and sufficient provocation. The court did note that
both Instructions No. 6 and No. 12 were now erroneous in stating that
179. Id. at 828, 515 N.W.2d at 657-58.
180. Id. But see State v. Derry, 248 Neb. 260, 267-69, 534 N.W.2d 302, 307-08 (1995).
In Derry, the defendant complained of an erroneous definition of "sudden quarrel"
and its relation to manslaughter. The court in Deny assumed, without deciding,
that the definition was wrong, but held that Derry was not prejudiced thereby
since the jury followed the step instruction and never considered the district
court's definition of "sudden quarrel."
181. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 829, 515 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1994).
182. 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989).
183. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 830, 515 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1994)(citation omitted).
184. Id. at 831, 515 N.W.2d at 659 (citing State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58
(1994)).
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the State was required to prove that the defendant intentionally killed
the victim to sustain a voluntary manslaughter conviction.1 8 5
If Jones determined that voluntary manslaughter need not be in-
tentional, the question remains if it may be. Additionally, step in-
struction schemes either confuse, fail to explicate, or negate a
defendant's chance to defend a second degree murder charge with the
partially excusing defense of provocation. The situation is exacer-
bated because Nebraska statutes describe one version of the man-
slaughter offense (voluntary manslaughter) with language that is
appropriate not to the offense, but to the partial defense of provocation
when it is raised to defend against a second degree murder charge.S6
It is possible for a prosecutor to believe that an actor killed as a
result of provocation and to proceed with an original charge of man-
slaughter. In such a situation it makes little difference if the killer
acted with an intention to kill. The key is that there is no serious
possibility that the State in such a situation has to prove a "sudden
quarrel" or adequate provocation. Under Pettit, the State simply
would have prove a death and an intention to kill.1s7
In State v. Pettit, 8 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the law of the manslaughter offense. The court traced the com-
mon law and Nebraska statutory history of manslaughter. Nebraska
statute section 28-305(1) articulated that manslaughter is "an inclu-
sive disjunction." "A person commits manslaughter if he kills another
without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally
while in the commission of an unlawful act."18 9 The statute thus cre-
ates two categories of manslaughter: (1) intentional killing, without
malice, "upon a sudden quarrel" (partially excused by provocation and
185. Id. at 832, 515 N.W.2d at 660.
186. See John R. Snowden, The Case for a Doctrine of Provocation in Nebraska, 61
NEB. L. REv. 565, 575-76 (1982)[hereinafter Snowden, Doctrine of Provocation];
John R. Snowden, Provoking Provocation, HABEAs CoRPus, Sept. 1991, at 6
(1991)[hereinafter Snowden, Provoking Provocation]. In State v. Cave, 240 Neb.
783, 789, 484 N.W.2d 458, 464 (1992), then Judge White suggested that the State
must prove the defendant killed upon a sudden quarrel to sustain a voluntary
manslaughter conviction. The suggestion was dicta and not relevant to any is-
sues raised in the case. Moreover, no authority is cited for the proposition and
none can be found in Nebraska or nationally.
187. State v. Pettit, 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W. 2d 890 (1989). Pettit was decided prior to
State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994), and lawyers in Pettit may
then have thought, incorrectly as it turns out, that second degree murder re-
quires only an intent to kill. If that was true, second degree murder and volun-
tary manslaughter would have identical elements: killing and intent to kill.
That is not a problem as long as the prosecutorial decision to choose one or the
other is based on an honest assessment of culpability. State v. Roth, 222 Neb.
119, 123, 382 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1986). Today it is clear that malice distinguishes
second degree murder from voluntary manslaughter.
188. 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989).
189. Id. at 445, 445 N.W.2d at 896 (emphasis omitted).
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
usually the result of using provocation as a defense); and (2) involun-
tary manslaughter, an unlawful but unintentional killing, without
malice, as the result of the defendant's commission of an unlawful act.
In Jones, the court pointed out that the terms "voluntary" and "in-
voluntary" have not been a part of the Nebraska manslaughter statute
since 1873.190 Moreover, the court did not discuss the disjunctive na-
ture of the statute. Instead, the court noted that after Pettit, "the only
element that distinguishes manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel and
second degree murder is the element of the sudden quarrel, since both
killings are intentional."1 9 1 The court did not phrase this in terms of
malice. But, it is malice that distinguishes the offenses, and "sudden
quarrel" or provocation either negates or excuses malice.
The Jones court then repeated the Nebraska homicide law and
stated the definition of malice: "the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse." Somehow the court then found that
"the presence or absence of an intention to kill is the distinction be-
tween the offenses. Because "our statutes define manslaughter as a
killing without malice, there is no requirement of an intention to kill
in committing manslaughter."19 2
The court seems confused. Malice in Nebraska was defined in the
opinion. Malice does not now, and perhaps never did, refer to specific
mens rea intentions (to kill, to do grievous bodily harm, to act with
"depraved heart" conscious disregard of extreme risk to human life).
It is malice that distinguishes the offenses: was the intention to kill
"without just cause or excuse?"
If the court continues to hold that a "voluntary" manslaughter situ-
ation does not require an intent to kill, then that path to obtaining a
manslaughter conviction seems to be a strict liability offense. Yet, it
cannot reasonably be that the law intends any death during a pro-
voked situation to be manslaughter.19 3 Suppose an actor returns
home and finds her spouse in the arms of another. The actor starts to
yell, scream, and accuse. While throwing this fit, the actor trips, caus-
ing a lamp and portable TV to fall onto the spouse, and death results.
This is a tragic accident; but without some mens rea requirement, it
could be prosecuted as manslaughter.
Avoiding this problem is easy enough for the State. In the unusual
situation of an original manslaughter charge in which the prosecu-
tion's investigation has determined that the death was the result of an
adequate provocation, the State could proceed by proving an unin-
tended death while in the commission of an unlawful act. Certainly
190. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 829, 515 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1994).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 830, 515 N.W.2d at 659.
193. Whatever the law intends, a strict liability homicide would raise serious constitu-
tional problems. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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the presence of an even greater culpability (an intention to kill) would
not affect a conviction. The real problem arises in the typical situation
in which the actor raises provocation as a defense.
Provocation always has been a controversial defense. Despite the
controversy, provocation is the traditional analytic device for distin-
guishing between the more or less blameworthy intentional killers.194
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider all of the issues of the
provocation defense in Nebraska or to argue for its expansion or con-
traction.19 5 The doctrinal function of the provocation defense, how-
ever, is fairly clear in Nebraska, and its structure is well recognized.
All but the last paragraph of instruction No. 12 in Jones accurately
reflects Nebraska law. The statutory phrase "sudden quarrel" is a
code or symbol for the notion of an adequate and reasonable provoca-
tion. If a killer kills while in a provoking situation, the heat of pas-
sion, clouding his reason with no time to restore it, then the homicide
is partially excused, and the actor is convicted of manslaughter rather
than murder.' 9 6 The most commonly recognized situation in which an
adequate provocation reduces murder to manslaughter is when one
kills after actually observing his or her spouse in an act of adultery. 97
Here the question is whether such a killer may intend the death, or to
put it another way, does provocation negate the mens rea of murder.
Or, are the mens rea elements of murder present, but excused in a
provoked killing?' 9 8
For Professor Dressler and others, the answer is clear.
Various courts explain the doctrine on the basis that the provoked killer
lacks the specific intent to kill. This is an acceptable excusing theory, but not
in provocation cases. Provocation not only causes anger, it motivates the actor
to want to kill the provoker. Proof, then, of adequate provocation does not
negative intent. It magnifies it. Case law to the contrary is erroneous. 1 9 9
194. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation, Emotional Dis-
turbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 248 (1986); Snowden,
Doctrine of Provocation, supra note 186.
195. See generally Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search
of a Rationale, 73 J. Cnm. LAw & CmnNOLOGy 421 (1982); Alan Reed, Duress
and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary Lessons from Recent Anglo-
American Jurisprudence, 6 FiA. ST. U. J. TRANSNATL L. & POL'Y 51, 70-92 (1996).
Both Dressler and Reed argue to expand the definition of provocation. Compare
Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997)(arguing for a more limited reformulation of
provocation).
196. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 831-32, 515 N.W.2d 654, 659-60 (1994).
197. See generally Manning's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 112 (1671). See also Rowland v.
State, 35 So. 826 (Miss. 1904); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, at 656.
198. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, at 653-54; Singer, supra note 194, at 306-14.
199. LAFAvE & ScOT, supra note 19, at 654 ('The usual type of voluntary manslaugh-
ter involves the intentional killing of another.... ."); Dressler, supra note 195, at
462.
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For Professor Singer, it is less clear that provoked killers always
intend to kill. In some situations the actor may intend to kill, but in
other cases, this may not be true. Some may simply "lose control" and
flail out, while others may have an intent to kill that was inspired by
the provocation. 20 0
All disputes over whether "malice" is or is not negated by "heat of passion"
are bound to be fruitless... just as disputes over whether all killers "in the
heat of passion" "intend" to kill are fruitless, for one simple reason-they are
sterile doctrinal controversies over semantic fictions. This is not to say that
the emotions themselves are fictions-it is not uncommon to experience mal-
ice, or hatred, or a "blinding rage." But these are mere metaphors, and to
expect one metaphor to "annul" another metaphor is ludicrous. 2 0 1
The obvious point of the partial excuse of provocation is to separate
the more (murder) from the less (manslaughter) blameworthy killer,
and the distinction turns on acting from extreme provocation rather
than sheer ill will.20 2
Although Jones states that a conviction for "voluntary" manslaugh-
ter does not require an intent to kill, it leaves open the question of
whether an actor defending a second degree murder charge by the par-
tial excuse of provocation may have a manslaughter instruction if the
actor intended to kill. The answer must be yes. Although in rare situ-
ations the provocation is so extreme that the actor is unable to form
any intent and simply flails out,203 most provoked actors want and
intend to kill. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is not required for the
provocation defense.
In Nebraska, second degree murder requires the prosecutor to es-
tablish two mens rea elements. It must be shown both that the actor
intended to kill and that the actor did so with malice-without just
cause or excuse.2 04 In whatever way provocation affects intention to
kill-negating or excusing-provocation remains a legally recognized
and mandated partial excuse. If a provocation defense is possible, it
must be considered; if the facts establish the defense, it must partially
excuse.20 5 There cannot be malice if there is provocation.
200. Singer, supra note 194, at 309-12.
201. Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 314. Provocation is widely recognized. See generally Winnebago v. Chey-
enne, reported in KARL LLEWELLYN & EDWARD HUBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 140-
46 (1941); THE ETHICs Op ARISTOTLE: THE NIcomAcHEN ETmIcs 112 (J.K-A.
Thomson trans., 1955); H.LA. HART, PUNsHmNT AND RESPONSmIUTY 22-24
(1968). See also Exodus 21:12-36; Deuteronomy 4:22:22, 4:41-42.
203. Dressler suggests such an extreme provocation should be a completely excusing
defense similar to insanity. Dressier, supra note 195, at 467. Singer is not quite
so bold, but does question why an extreme situation does not completely excuse.
Singer, supra note 194, at 309-10.
204. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 523 N.W.2d 681 (1994).
205. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 315 N.W.2d 250 (1982).
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Unfortunately, although Nebraska law is clear on the definition
and result of a provocation defense, only a record of confusion or obfus-
cation tells juries how the defense works. For example, look at the
last paragraph of Instruction No. 12 in Jones: "Therefore, if the evi-
dence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
killed Tara Jones intentionally upon a sudden quarrel, you should find
him guilty of the offense of manslaughter. 2 06 This was the last para-
graph of an instruction that defined the notion of provocation. But,
the context in which it appeared and the way in which it was phrased
reasonably could have led a juror to conclude that the defendant had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was provoked. Of
course, that is not the case. Provocation is the excuse that negates
malice and yields manslaughter-"kill another without malice."2 07
The step instruction asks the jury to consider for second degree
murder whether the defendant intended to kill and also should ask
whether the defendant acted with malice. If one believes, as did the
court in Jones, that the step instruction does not unfairly prevent the
jury from a preliminary consideration of the lesser manslaughter
charge, 2 08 the instruction nevertheless provides the jury with no indi-
cation as to how to reach that result. Following the statutory defini-
tion of second degree murder with the statutory definition of
manslaughter (whether or not its "voluntary" variety requires an in-
tent to kill) does not guide the jury's decision. The instruction must
tell the jury how provocation (assuming it is properly defined) works
to partially excuse a killing that otherwise would be murder.
The courts must tell the fact-finder more than the definition of the
offenses and more than the definition of an adequate provocation. The
jury needs to be told how the defense works. Some version of the in-
struction suggested here should be included:
The defense has produced evidence that makes provocation important to
this case. Provocation may explain an intent to kill so that even if such an
intent exists, the homicide that otherwise would be murder is partially ex-
cused and punished as manslaughter.
You have been instructed that to prove second degree murder the actor
must have both intended to kill and acted with malice. Malice is the inten-
tional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Provocation is a
legally recognized excuse and one of the excuses or justifications that, if pres-
206. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 832, 515 N.W.2d 654, 660 (1994).
207. NEB Rv. STAT. § 28-305 (Reissue 1995).
208. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 828, 515 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1994). But see State v.
Derry, 248 Neb. 260, 534 N.W.2d 302 (1995)(holding that the defendant was not
prejudiced by an instruction on provocation that was assumed to be erroneous
because the step instruction prevented the jury from considering it). It also
should be noted that a "step" instruction ascending from manslaughter to second
degree murder and then to first degree murder seems more coherent with the
presumption of innocence than the descending instructions used in Nebraska.
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ent, would mean the defendant did not act with malice, even if you believe the
defendant intended to kill the deceased.
When the act causing the death of another is done as a result of an ade-
quate provocation for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, any
resulting intentional or unintentional homicide is no greater than
manslaughter.
An adequate provocation, for which there is reasonable explanation or ex-
cuse, causes the actor to lose normal self-control. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the actor's situation under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be.
To establish that a killing is murder and not voluntary manslaughter, the
burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of
murder and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor did not act as a
result of adequate provocation.
C. The Problem of State v. Cave: Must the State Prove
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Accused Did
Not Act from an Adequate Provocation?
[The fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation-has been, almost from the inception of the common law
of homicide, the single most important factor in determining the degree of
culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 20 9
In a criminal case the State must prove every element of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt.210 The State may not shift the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant to disprove any element of an
offense by any persuasive burden.2 11 On the other hand, once the ele-
ments of an offense are defined, the state may create defenses of
avoidance that excuse or mitigate the offense after its elements have
been established and may require the defendant to prove these de-
fenses. 2 12 The law has not found any principled basis to distinguish
(1) that which must be defined as an element of an offense, and (2)
that which, once the elements of an offense have been established,
may be considered as a defending excuse or justification and thus
place the burden of persuasion on the accused. 2 13 Consequently, the
209. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696 (1975).
210. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
211. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979). Cf. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)(holding that the defendant may
be required to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence since self-
defense does not negate an element of the offense of purposely causing the death
of another).
212. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
213. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 138, at 545-52; Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v.
Wilbur, The Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examina-
tion of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEx. L. REv. 269 (1977); John
Jeffries & Paul Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and the Burden of Proof in
the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Stephen Saltzburg, Burdens of Per-
suasion in Criminal Cases: Harmonizing the Views of the Justices, 20 AM. GRIM.
L. REV. 393 (1984).
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law simply looks to what has been done-what are the elements of the
offense and does the offered defense negate one of the elements?
Although raised in State v. Cave,2 14 the Nebraska Supreme Court
did not answer this matter regarding the defense of provocation and
the elements of second degree murder. But, the questions can no
longer be set aside.
In State v. Cave, John Cave was convicted after a bench trial of
second degree murder for killing Rose Kimball. Cave had asked to
remain at Kimball's house and was refused. He became upset and an-
gry, and after a somewhat protracted argument, Cave shot Kimball
from the backseat of her car as she was preparing to drive him
home.21 5 On appeal, Cave argued that the prosecution was constitu-
tionally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing
was not inspired by an adequate provocation.2 16
The supreme court stated that Nebraska law requires three ele-
ments to prove second degree murder: (1) the death, (2) the intent to
kill, and (3) causation.2 17 Consequently, the court thought it was at
least unclear whether or not the State had the burden of proving the
214. 240 Neb. 783, 484 N.W.2d 458 (1992). States vary on the placement of the bur-
den to prove or disprove provocation and on the appropriate instruction to the
jury. The differing instructions are, of course, driven by the unique homicide law
of each state.
Some states place the burden of disproving provocation on the prosecution.
See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41.115, -81.900(b)(16) (Michie 1996); People v.
Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991); Miner v. State, 485 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1997);
Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1992); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 584
N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1992); Sims v. State, 573 A.2d 1317 (Md. 1990); State v. Hes-
lop, 639 A.2d 1100 (N.J. 1994); State v. Hatcher, No. 95-279, 1997 WL 659359
(Vt. Oct. 24, 1997); State v. Lee, 321 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1982).
Other states place the burden on the defendant to prove provocation. See, e.g.,
State v. Kingsley, 851 P.2d 370 (Kan. 1993); State v. Smith, 571 So. 2d 133 (La.
1990); State v. Michaud, 611 A.2d 61 (Me. 1992); State v. Auchampach, 540
N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1995); State v. Montague, 259 S.E.2d 899 (N.C. 1979); State v.
Rhodes, 590 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1992); Commonwealth v. Speight, 677 A.2d 317
(Pa. 1996); State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1996); State v. McGuire, No.
23671, 1997 WL 403714 (W. Va. July 18, 1997); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 102 (Wyo.
1995).
Still other states use extreme emotional distress rather than provocation as
the exculpatory concept. See, e.g., Amr. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-104 (Michie 1997);
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-702 (1993); State v. Raguseo, 622 A.2d 519 (Conn. 1993);
Moore v. State, 456 A.2d 1223 (Del. 1983); McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875
S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1994); People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1976); State v.
Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1982).
Finally, one state uses provocation solely as a mitigating factor at the punish-
ment stage. See TE. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 1994).
215. State v. Cave, 240 Neb. 783, 784-86, 484 N.W.2d 458, 461-62 (1992).
216. Id. at 787, 484 N.W.2d at 463.
217. Id. at 789, 484 N.W.2d at 464. Although State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510
N.W.2d 58 (1994), states that in 1994, Nebraska recognized malice as an element
of second degree murder, the court did not notice or discuss malice in Cave. See
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absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, it was un-
clear whether (1) provocation negated an intent to kill, which was an
element of the offense, and thus provocation could not be an issue that
the defendant was required to prove; or (2) provocation was a defense
of avoidance that did not affect the elements of second degree murder
and provocation was an issue the defense could be required to
prove.2 18 The court then refused to decide the proper placement of the
burden. Instead, for the purpose of its decision, the court assumed
that even if the State had the burden, the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conviction.21 9
After State v. Myers and the malice revolution or rediscovery, it
now seems clear that the State has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act from an adequate
provocation. Second degree murder has two mens rea elements: (1)
an intent to kill, and (2) malice, the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse.2 20 The State must prove both mens rea
elements beyond a reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden on
either element to the defendant.
If the crime of second degree murder requires only the mens rea
element of intent to kill, then it might be possible to force the defend-
ant to prove an adequate provocation by some burden, most likely by a
preponderance of the evidence.2 21 If second degree murder requires
only an intent to kill, and voluntary manslaughter requires no intent
to kill, as held in State v. Jones,2 22 then the question remains, as dis-
cussed earlier, whether a killer having a provocation defense, as dis-
tinguished from an original manslaughter charge, may act with an
intent to kill. It was argued that many, if not most, provoked killers
do indeed have an intent to kill.223 In such a situation, intent to kill,
an element of second degree, would not be negated by provocation.
also State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 489-93, 519 N.W.2d 507, 518-21
(1994)(Wright, J., dissenting); Shugrue, supra note 11, at 36-39.
218. State v. Cave, 240 Neb. 783, 790, 484 N.W.2d 458, 464 (1992). Compare Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)(holding that when malice is an element of
murder, the State must prove absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt),
with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)(holding that when murder re-
quires only an intent to kill, the state may require the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted under "extreme emotional distur-
bance"). See also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)(holding that the state may
require the accused to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence since
self-defense does not negate an element of intentional killing).
219. State v. Cave, 240 Neb. 783, 790-92, 484 N.W.2d 458, 464-66 (1992).
220. State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 523 N.W.2d 681 (1994); State v. Myers, 244 Neb.
905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994).
221. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473,
488-93, 519 N.W.2d 507, 518-21 (1994)(Wright, J., dissenting).
222. 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994).
223. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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The state could then ask that the accused prove provocation as an
avoidance defense-the elements of the crime have been satisfied, but
an excusing or justifying circumstance still remains.2 24
As discussed earlier, the law does not provide any principled basis
from which to distinguish issues that must be an element of the of-
fense and issues that may be assigned to the accused as matters of
avoidance.2 25 In Martin v. Ohio,226 the United States Supreme Court
approved an Ohio law that required a defendant to prove self-defense
by a preponderance of the evidence since self-defense did not negate
an intent to kill. But, beyond statutory language and maneuvering,
each state must determine for itself as a matter of justice who should
bear the burden on crucial issues. With regard to the justifying de-
fense of self-defense, for example, Nebraska requires the State to dis-
prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has
met a minimal burden of production on the issue.22 7 The same should
be the case for the partially excusing defense of provocation, which
has deep and powerful roots as an issue that distinguishes between
murder and manslaughter.
If the law determines that a provoked killer must be so provoked
that it is impossible to form an intent to kill, then provocation would
negate intention when raised as a defense.2 2s Of course, the law could
meet the obligation of requiring the State to prove every element of
the offense simply by reiterating the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and leaving the jury to imply how provocation ne-
gates intention. Yet in such a situation, clarity and fairness should
direct the trial court to instruct the jury that the defendant has raised
the provocation issue, and the State now must prove its absence be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Whatever the outcome of the relation of intent to kill and provoca-
tion, the second required mens rea element of second degree murder-
malice-seems to demand that the State prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of adequate provocation. Unlike the situation at
the time of State v. Cave,2 2 9 malice, the intentional doing of a wrong-
ful act without just cause or excuse, is clearly now required for a sec-
224. In his dissent in State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 486-94, 519 N.W.2d 507, 517-21
(1994), Judge Wright suggested this possibility while arguing that Myers errone-
ously required malice as an element of second degree murder. Yet, Wright did
not consider the difference between proving a manslaughter charge in a "volun-
tary" manslaughter situation and using provocation as a defense to murder.
Moreover, Myers is the law and requires a second mens rea-malice.
225. See supra note 213.
226. 480 U.S. 228 (1987). At the time, only two states took such a position. Id.
227. State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 375, 403, 507 N.W.2d 253, 272 (1993).
228. In such a situation, the question should arise why such a killer is not excused
entirely as would be one who was insane. See supra note 203.
229. 240 Neb. 783, 484 N.W.2d 458 (1992).
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ond degree murder conviction. Consequently, Nebraska's statutory
scheme now positively looks like Maine's scheme in Mullaney v. Wil-
bur,230 and malice as an element requires the State to disprove provo-
cation. Moreover, malice in Nebraska is not a symbol for the specific
intentions to kill, to do grievous bodily harm, or to act with a "de-
praved heart" conscious disregard of an extreme risk to human life. It
involves precisely what provocation is all about-whether or not the
killer had an excuse or justification 23 1 for the killing.232
When the defendant meets the minimal burden of production and
puts provocation at issue, due process requires that the State prove
the absence of provocation because the mens rea element of malice
cannot be present if there is an excuse or justification. The State must
prove that the killing was intentionally done without the excuse of
provocation. This obligation might be met by reiterating the State's
burden to prove both an intent to kill and malice (including its defini-
tion) beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, however, clarity and fairness
would seem to require that the matter be explained and precisely put
before the jury. Without a specific instruction, neither a statement of
the second degree murder and manslaughter offenses, nor a definition
of malice and adequate provocation reasonably directs the jury.
Provocation is a legally recognized and mandated excuse. If an ad-
equate provocation is present, the fact-finder lacks any discretion to
ignore it and then convict of murder.23 3 Due process and human jus-
tice require a specific instruction in appropriate cases.
To establish that a killing is second degree murder and not voluntary man-
slaughter, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of second degree murder and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the actor did not act as a result of adequate provocation.
230. 421 U.S. 684 (1975)(holding that when malice is required as an element of mur-
der, due process requires the State to prove the absence of provocation beyond a
reasonable doubt).
231. It often is important to distinguish between an excuse and a justification. See
generally FLETCHER, supra note 138, at 759-62, 810-11. Professor Fletcher argues
that justification challenges the wrongfulness of the act, while excuse concedes
wrong, but challenges blame or attribution of the act to the actor. Id. at 759. The
excuse-justification distinction also may affect issues of other's rights to resist the
actor, the rights of others to aid the actor, and the precedential value of a not
guilty finding. Id. at 760-62, 810-11. There is no reason to believe, however, that
the distinction 'just cause or excuse" makes any difference in regard to malice.
Either an excuse or justification negates malice when, as in Nebraska, it is a
general criminal intent or bad attitude.
232. "Malice is that condition of the mind which is manifested by the intentional doing
of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse." State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 885,
523 N.W.2d 681, 693 (1994).
233. If evidence supports the fact-finder's finding of provocation, a trial court must
instruct on manslaughter. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 424-25, 315 N.W.2d 250,
255 (1982).
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D. The Problem of State v. Ryan and State v. White: Are
There Excuses or Justifications that Although Not
Recognized and Mandated by Law May
Negate Malice?
People distinguish right and wrong.
2 3 4
A person accused of second degree murder might admit the killing
act, but then might offer an excuse or justification for that act. Some
excuses or justifications are recognized and mandated by law. If the
killing was the result of adequate provocation, it may be punished
only as manslaughter. If the actor proves that she was criminally in-
sane at the time of the killing, she must be acquitted. If the actor
killed in justified self-defense, conviction may not follow.
A killer also may have an excuse or justification that is neither
recognized nor mandated by law. Consider, the following examples:
"I had been beaten and abused, and didn't know what else to do."
"I followed the will of God."
"I was just trying to protect myself."
"I was brainwashed."
"That's just the way I am."
"He asked to die."
State v. Ryan235 and State v. White236 suggest that all of the excuses
or justifications imagined above might negate malice in Nebraska
even though none of them are recognized or mandated as a matter of
law.
In State v. Ryan, on a postconviction motion, the court held that
Dennis Ryan was entitled to a new trial because the jury that con-
victed him of second degree murder had not been instructed that it
had to find that malice was an element of the offense. 23 7 In so hold-
ing, the court explained in depth why it believed malice should be in-
cluded as an element of second degree murder.238 Here, the focus
234. John Rockwell Snowden, The Justification Story: Law as Integrity and Devia-
tionist Doctrine, 9 J. L. & RELIGION 49, 68 (1991). See also G.S. KIK, HERACLITUS
Tim Coszuc FRAGMNTS 232 (1962)("If all existing things were to become smoke
the nostrils would distinguish them.").
235. 249 Neb. 218, 543 N.W.2d 128 (1996).
236. 249 Neb. 381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996).
237. State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 228-29, 543 N.W.2d 128, 137-38 (1996).
238. Id. at 223-28, 543 N.W.2d at 135-38. See also Shugrue, supra note 11. Professor
Shugrue analyzes the court's argument that due process principles of constitu-
tional criminal procedure require that malice be an element of second degree
murder. Professor Shugrue does not discuss the substantive criminal law issues
of malice in Nebraska. When Professor Shugrue does refer to malice, he defines
it as specific intentions to kill, do grievous bodily harm, or act with a depraved
heart. Id. at 32-33. This is a common mistake. See Snowden, Doctrine of Provo-
cation, supra note 186, at 565 n.1. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that malice has
ever been so defined by the Nebraska Supreme Court, and it clearly is not the
current definition of malice.
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turns to the court's conclusion that the error in failing to require the
jury to find malice was not harmless error.
Dennis Ryan killed James Timm while both were members of a
cult led by Ryan's father. The father referred to God as "Yahweh" and
claimed divine direction for his strict and brutal control of the cult.
Timm had fallen out of favor, and Dennis Ryan was ordered by his
father to torture and then kill Timm. Dennis Ryan properly raised an
insanity defense, but was convicted by a jury of second degree mur-
der.2 39 The State argued that the failure to require the jury to find
malice was harmless error because Ryan did not produce evidence to
show a lack of malice, i.e., a just cause or excuse. The court rejected
this argument, however, because Ryan "did present evidence at trial
that he was under 'mind control' during the crime and 'was not acting
on his own free will.'"240
Unlike provocation, insanity, or self-defense, "mind control" is not
a legally recognized and mandated defense. Nevertheless, Ryan holds
that such an excuse might be considered by a jury to negate malice.
Malice in Nebraska derives from the early days of the common law; it
is the notion of a general criminal intent-a bad or evil attitude with-
out any just cause or excuse.2 41
It did not suffice that Ryan properly raised an insanity defense.24 2
Insanity must be proved by the defendant.243 More importantly, fol-
lowing the McNaghten rule, insanity must be a result of mental dis-
ease or defect that caused the actor not to understand the nature of
what was being done or to not know the difference between right and
wrong with respect to what was being done.244
The insanity plea, rejected by the jury, did not fit the reality of
Ryan's situation. He offered "mind control" as an excuse. It was
caused by his father, the cult, and isolation, not by mental disease or
defect. Ryan may have known his acts and their quality. His excuse
was "mind control," and a jury should have been instructed that the
State had to prove that it was not a just cause or excuse.
239. State v. Ryan, 226 Neb. 59, 409 N.W.2d 579 (1987).
240. State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 230, 543 N.W.2d 128, 138-39 (1996). The court re-
ferred to the trial testimony of Dr. Cole, who stated that "the defendant was 'to-
tally under the domination of his father," and the testimony of Priscilla Coates,
who stated that "the element of mind control was present at the Rulo farm, in
that the members were isolated and there was a kind of group paranoia." State v.
Ryan, 226 Neb. 59, 72, 74, 409 N.W.2d 579, 587, 589 (1987).
241. Sayre, supra note 2, at 988-94. See State v. Moniz, 224 Neb. 198, 204, 397
N.W.2d 37, 41 (1986)(describing malice as "any willful or corrupt intention of the
mind").
242. State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 234-36, 543 N.W.2d 128, 140-42 (1996).
243. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1995).
244. State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, 345 N.W.2d 806 (1984).
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It might be possible to couch a "mind control" excuse in the lan-
guage of duress. Duress often is legally recognized and mandated as a
defense in situations in which the actor engaged in conduct due to
threats of force against his person that a person of reasonable firm-
ness would be unable to resist.24 5 Yet, Nebraska and most jurisdic-
tions do not recognize duress in a homicide case. 24 6 Likewise, the
threat of force type of coercion fails to capture the "mind control" in
the cult situation presented in Ryan.247
It is apparent from Ryan that a just cause or excuse that might
negate malice need not be a legally recognized and mandated defense.
A jury must find that the defendant killed without just cause or ex-
cuse, and a jury might recognize an excuse or justification that the law
does not recognize. In such a situation the defendant's homicide
would be without malice and reduced to manslaughter.
Just two weeks after Ryan, the Nebraska Supreme Court again
found that in a second degree murder case, malice might be negated
by a "just cause or excuse" that was not recognized or mandated by
law. In State v. White, again on a postconviction motion, the court
held that Calvin White was denied due process of law when the jury
that convicted him of second degree murder was not instructed that
malice was an element of the offense.2 48 This time, the offered justifi-
cation or excuse was that White had acted "with a protective intent
rather than with a criminal intent devoid of justification or excuse, [in
which case] such person does not act with malice and cannot be con-
victed of second degree murder."2 49
The State argued that the jury had found the equivalent of malice
when it rejected White's self-defense claim,25 0 i.e., the justification of
self-defense was rejected, and so the killing must have been without
just cause or excuse. The court held that "[tihe absence of self-defense
245. See generally United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984);
State v. Hunter, 740 P.2d 559 (Kan. 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1985).
246. State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 278 N.W.2d 756 (1979). Duress might be available
to a coerced participant in a felony murder situation. See State v. Hunter, 740
P.2d 559 (Kan. 1987). But see State v. Perkins, 219 Neb. 491, 364 N.W.2d 20
(1983).
247. See United States v. Fishman, 742 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1990)(rejecting the
defense of "brainwashing" as not sufficiently established in the scientific
community).
248. 249 Neb. 381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996).
249. Id. at 386, 543 N.W.2d at 729.
250. The jury was instructed on second degree murder as follows:
The material elements which the State must prove by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict [White] of the crime of murder in
the second degree are:
1. That [he] caused the death ....
2. That [he] did so intentionally but without premeditation;
3. That [he] did not act in self defense.
Id. at 384, 543 N.W.2d at 728.
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may coexist with the absence of malice."2 51 Because a successful self-
defense claim must have both a reasonable and honest or actual (good
faith) belief in the necessity of using deadly force,2 52 an accused might
have an honest but unreasonable belief that would not establish self-
defense, but would negate malice.2 53 Consequently, the rejection of
self-defense was not equivalent to finding malice, the intentional do-
ing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.2 5 4
Judge Gerrard dissented, stating that "[an intentional killing is
either justified, as defined by statute, or it is murder, as defined by
statute."255 Gerrard is correct that an honest and reasonable belief in
the necessity of deadly force should completely exonerate the defend-
ant and result in a not guilty verdict. But, the law at different times
and places has given different answers to the effect of an "imperfect"
self-defense claim.
The classic case of "imperfect" self-defense is Commonwealth v. Co-
landro.2 5 6 Dominic Colandro had been intimidated and threatened by
the deceased, Ferdinand Rocco. But, the facts were in dispute as to
the events surrounding the shooting of Rocco. The jury was instructed
that its choice was either murder or self-defense. On appeal the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that
in addition to the instruction on the law of self-defense, the jury should have
been told, if they found that at the time of the shooting the defendant was not
actuated by malice, but that he acted under the influence of an uncontrollable
mortal fear raised by the threats and conduct of Rocco, and if they thought
that the immediate circumstances, though adequate to raise the fear, were not
sufficient reasonably to justify a belief on the part of the defendant that he
was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, the grade of the crime
would not rise higher than manslaughter. 25 7
Early Nebraska cases recognized the "imperfect" self-defense. Lu-
cas v. State2 S8 is perhaps the best known case to so hold and was fol-
251. Id. at 385-86, 543 N.W.2d at 729.
252. Id. at 386 (citing State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 375, 507 N.W.2d 253 (1993)).
253. Id. at 386-87, 543 N.W.2d at 729-30.
254. Id. at 387, 543 N.W.2d at 730.
255. Id. at 393, 543 N.W.2d at 733 (Gerrard, J., dissenting).
256. 80 A. 571 (Pa. 1911).
257. Id. at 574. Several jurisdictions follow the direction of Colandro. See People v.
Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979); Faulkner v. State, 458 AK2d 81 (Md. 1983). Some
states also recognize an "imperfect" self-defense when deadly force is used in a
situation that would justify only nonlethal force. See State v. Clark, 77 P. 287
(Kan. 1904). The "imperfect" self-defense also has been recognized when the de-
fendant was at fault in provoking the affray at a nondeadly level of force. See
State v. McAvoy, 417 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1992). Finally, the problem might be
treated as one of recklessness. See Shannon v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548
(Ky. 1988).
258. 78 Neb. 454, 111 N.W. 145 (1907).
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lowed 259 until State v. Beers26o in 1978. In Beers, Robert Beers was
driving around Nebraska City looking for his estranged wife and
drinking beer. When two police officers attempted to talk with him
and settle him down, Beers shot at the officers with the shotgun he
was carrying. One of the officers was killed, and Beers was charged
and convicted of murder in the first degree.
On appeal Beers argued that it was error to not instruct on man-
slaughter.261 Beers argued that he believed he was fired upon with-
out warning by someone, making it necessary for him to shoot in self-
defense. The trial court instructed on self-defense. On appeal the
court affirmed the "either-or-situation: either Beers was innocent be-
cause the killing was done in self-defense or he was guilty of
murder.262
Today, Robert Beers would raise his "protective intent" to negate
malice. The "imperfect" self-defense, although not legally recognized
or mandated, could be considered by the jury as a justification or ex-
cuse that would reduce the homicide to manslaughter if the jury be-
lieved the 'just" or normative worth of the claim and its basis in the
facts.
It is important to be clear that a jury that fails to find malice and
convicts of the lesser manslaughter offense is not making law and cre-
ating a mandated legally recognized defense.263 Sparf v. United
States264 is cited in State v. Ryan for the proposition that an accused is
entitled to have a jury rather than a judge reach the requisite finding
of guilt.26 5 Sparf more often is recognized as the watershed case in
which the United States Supreme Court held that in federal trials a
259. See State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); State v. Kimbrough,
173 Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422 (1962); Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40 N.W. 420
(1888); Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895). But see Veneziano v.
State, 139 Neb. 526, 297 N.W. 92 (1941). The availability of an "imperfect" self-
defense may have particular relevance to cases of spouse or child abuse. See Don-
ald L. Creach, Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered
Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1982).
260. 201 Neb. 714, 271 N.W.2d 842 (1978).
261. Id. at 716, 271 N.W.2d at 844.
262. Id. at 724-25, 271 N.W.2d at 848.
263. This reading of the law is based on the idea that State v. White, 249 Neb. 381, 543
N.W.2d 725 (1996), did not overrule Beers and mandate that the "imperfect" self-
defense be legally recognized. Rather, one jury might be convinced of the norma-
tive appeal of"imperfect" self-defense, and another jury may not. Consequently,
the court's statement in White that "such person does not act with malice and
cannot be convicted of second degree murder," id. at 386, 543 N.W.2d at 729, is
not to be taken literally. Rather, such a person may not have acted with malice.
If White has established an "imperfect" self-defense as a mandated defense, then
State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 54 N.W.2d 128 (1996), still supports the unlimited
possibility of negating malice.
264. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
265. State v. Ryan, 249 Neb. 218, 231, 543 N.W.2d 128, 139 (1996).
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jury need not be informed of its nullification power.2 6 6 The Nebraska
law of murder, malice, and manslaughter allows a second degree mur-
der defendant to introduce any "just cause or excuse" that is articu-
lated and based in fact to be considered by the jury or fact-finder to
negate malice and reduce the homicide to manslaughter. Ryan and
White are watershed cases.
This Author has suggested that every defendant should be entitled
to tell his story of justification or excuse and ask the judge or jury to
enter a general verdict of not guilty on that basis. Such a right would
be in addition to any and all legally recognized defenses that if estab-
lished must result in an acquittal or conviction of only a lesser
charge. 2 67 Nebraska law does not go so far. But, Nebraska's use of
malice as a general criminal intent-an intent without any just cause
or excuse-does allow a jury in Nebraska to hear the plea of the ac-
cused and reduce what might otherwise be second degree murder to
manslaughter whether or not such plea is grounded as a legally recog-
nized defense.2 68
From its earliest judicial recognition to the present, the measure-
ment of homicides in Nebraska has included the notion that the jury
or fact-finder must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the killer
acted "without just cause or excuse." Ryan and White have made clear
that any excuse is to be considered. As a result, battered spouses or
children who kill have an avenue for the jury to consider their story.
The mercy killer will no longer find ears completely closed. The slayer
of a person who killed a loved one might be partially excused. And, a
person from a culture where a killing of the deceased would be appro-
priate in the circumstances would be able to bring a more complete
account of culpability to the jury.
If the purpose of the criminal law is to impose punishment, to de-
ter, isolate, or even rehabilitate, rather than simply to provide society
a legitimated avenue for its repressed desires for violence, then surely
the law must concern itself with the mysterious matter of just propor-
tion. The difference between murder and manslaughter is a quintes-
266. See RIcHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND READING IN CRMINAL LAW 28-30 (2d ed. 1996). See generally
Alan W. Sheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168
(1972)(reviewing jury nullification from the eighteenth century until 1972).
267. See Snowden, supra note 234. But see Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses
and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233 (1993).
268. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2027 (Reissue 1995)("verdict in trials for murder,
conviction by confession; procedure to determine degree of crime. In all trials for
murder the jury before whom such trial is had, if they find the prisoner guilty
thereof, shall ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder in the first or second
degree, or manslaughter; and if such person be convicted by confession in open
court, the court shall proceed by examination of witnesses in open court, to deter-
mine the degree of the crime, and shall pronounce sentence accordingly.").
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sential manifestation of this mystery. Both the murderer and the
manslaughterer are said to be deserving of the criminal sanction, but
who justly deserves life and who justly deserves twenty years?
In the case of provocation, the law has evolved from an attempt to
clearly demarcate the two by strict rules toward a tendency to present
the matter to the jury with an explanation of the appropriate legal
concepts. 26 9 Professor Singer argues that this is a positive trend and
is a case of "less really is more."2 70 He points out that more than one
hundred years ago, the Kentucky Supreme Court saw the virtue of
simply leaving the matter of "adequate provocation" to the jury. Fur-
ther, such a procedure eradicates the errors and difficulties of incon-
sistency, inaccuracy, and formalism.2 7 1
Leaving the question of whether or not the accused acted with mal-
ice, without any just cause or excuse, to the fact-finder's discretion
does not create anarchy, though it may yield boundaries different from
what the law may proscribe.272 The common sense justice of the jury
is grounded in the material world-the conditions and experiences of
social life. The jury would not follow the simple heuristic of a rule in
deciding whether or not a defendant has a just cause or excuse for
killing a sleeping spouse who had brutally abused the killer for years.
Rather, the jury would look holistically at all the facts and apply a
"complex calculus" of psychology, narrative, and subjectivity.27 3
There is every reason to believe that people will distinguish right and
wrong.
Blackstone stated that "an unwarrantable act without a vicious
will is no crime at all."274 Of course, who is to define "vicious will?" In
the Nebraska law of homicide, it is left to the jury. As Professor Sayre
noted more than sixty-five years ago, "[iut is, in last analysis, underly-
ing ethical concepts which shape and give direction to the growth of
the criminal law."27 5
V. CONCLUSION (AND A JURISPRUDENTIAL ASIDE THAT
MAY BE THE HEART OF THE MATTER)
Malice always has distinguished murder and manslaughter. Mal-
ice began in the early common law as a general criminal intent or bad
attitude. As part of the struggle between the King, Parliament, and
269. Singer, supra note 194, at 261-304.
270. Id. at 322.
271. Id. (citing Campbell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 290, 292 (Ky. 1889)).
272. See Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brood-
ing: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV. 742,
795-96 (1995).
273. Id.
274. 4 Wnmi BLAcKsToNE, ColamiNTrAms *21.
275. Sayre, supra note 2, at 988.
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the People, it at one time focused on the prior planning of a killing and
eventually matured as a symbol for specific intentions to kill, do griev-
ous bodily harm, or act with a "depraved-heart."
Although the early territorial statutes of Nebraska may have re-
flected the late common law understanding of malice as specific inten-
tions, from the time of statehood the homicide law of Nebraska has
consistently treated malice as a general criminal intent. Malice in Ne-
braska is the state of mind reflected in the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Until very recently, it has
been an easily ignored issue in the cases.
Today malice has become a critical issue. The law and the fact-
finder must be careful to distinguish malice from the other mens rea
that has always been required for second degree murder, an intention
to kill. The law must decide whether or not a killer who raises provo-
cation as a partial excuse to second degree murder may have acted
with an intent to kill that was inspired by an adequate provocation.
The courts must face the problem of whether or not the State must
prove that the accused acted without provocation (or any other offered
just cause or excuse) beyond a reasonable doubt. Satisfactory resolu-
tion is necessary for the issue of whether to clarify this for the fact-
finder or to leave it hidden in a general instruction that demands that
the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Finally, will the law continue to offer the accused killer the
opportunity to argue that the actor's intent is not criminal by bringing
culpability and just punishment into frll consideration grounded in
reality by allowing a jury to recognize that justifications or excuses not
yet legally mandated may be considered to negate malice?
On April 14, 1997, Judge Laurence Silberman, United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, spoke at the Ne-
braska College of Law at the invitation of the College and the
Federalist Society. Judge Silberman's topic was "Activism in the
Courts-Who is Responsible?" At one point in his very interesting
and insightful talk, Judge Silberman attempted to distinguish the
judge who is appropriately creative in following the law from the judge
who just cannot or will not follow the law.
This Author always has found it difficult to follow the law. Per-
haps, I thought, my "following-the-law" faculty is underdeveloped.
The thought came to me because I had just finished reading Law and
Phrenology by Professor Pierre Schlag.2 7 6 Professor Schlag raises dif-
ficult questions about the ontological status of law. Particularly, is
law similar to the now deceased science of phrenology?
Phrenology was a practice that identified basic brain functions or
"faculties" and then found their presence or absence in cranial fea-
276. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARv. L. Rav. 877 (1997).
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tures. For instance, one phrenologist had this to say about Chief Jus-
tice Marshall.
[I]is head was "remarkable for its fine proportions." Chief Justice Marshall's
head displayed "strong preponderance" of the "higher sentiments and higher
intellect." The organs of Comparison, Causality, Individuality, Benevolence,
Reverence, Firmness, Conscientiousness, and Ideality were "noticeably large,"
while the organs of Self-esteem and Love of Approbation were "but
moderate."277
Professor Schlag argues that law is quite similar to phrenology in
that its basic units of analysis, doctrines, and principles share an am-
biguous ontological status with the "faculties" of phrenology. They
have, like "faculties," a "reified animism." Doctrines and principles
are not just descriptive classifications, but the law itself in object-form
and propositional statements.2 78 Moreover, these doctrines and prin-
ciples do things that are fully animated all by themselves. "Provoca-
tion," for example, partially excuses homicide. It is the legal doctrine
that performs, not human beings, not human attitudes, not human
understandings, not human psychic experiences of right and duty.279
The law, like the "faculties" of phrenology, lives with ghost beings,
which it directs to punishment or reward.2 8 0
Schlag argues that even if "we are all realists now," the ontological
nature of law remains the same. The legal academy perhaps has ex-
panded the search to include economics, literature, social sciences,
and strange philosophies of foreign lands, but the unit sought remains
the same--the principles and doctrines. 28 1 Moreover, the units of
analysis cannot be stabilized because they are in part intelligent
knowledge and in part authoritative action. The law and its discipli-
nary knowledge is true because the state makes it true.28 2
This Article has examined the Nebraska statutes and cases, felt for
their cranial features, and followed the cerebral localization hypothe-
sis.283 Nevertheless, as the phrenologists found out, the future is not
yet written.
277. Id. at 893 (citing Character of Chief Justice Marshall, 1 Am. PHRENOLOGICAL J.
382, 383-84 (1839)).
278. Id. at 898, 900.
279. Id. at 898.
280. See John Rockwell Snowden, Living With Ghosts, 70 NEB. L. REv. 446 (1991).
281. Schlag, supra note 276, at 902-06. It is as if the phrenologists looked beyond the
cranial features to find the "faculties" in the feet, arms, and torso.
282. Id. at 915-17.
283. The cerebral localization hypothesis is that the brain is subdivided into various
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at 879.
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